

Easy Access, Easy Wins? Advocating for Inclusive Education in Cameroon

Zuleikha Mohammed



University of Amsterdam Graduate School of Social Sciences

MSc International Development Studies

July 2016

Candidate No: 10969802

Supervisor: Willem Elbers

Field Supervisor: Walter Nkwi

Second Reader: Olga Nieuwenhuijs

Acknowledgments

I would like to firstly thank my supervisor Willem Elbers and Walter Nkwi for their continuous support, ideas and advice throughout this entire project. In addition, this study would not have been possible without the dedicated staff of CBCHS, SEEPD and their cluster. I would like to especially thanks SEEPD's Education Officer, Julius Tangem and my research partner Sebastian Potthof for their expertise, support and friendship. Finally, I would like to give personal thanks to my family as their principles, values and strength when dealing with disability within our own family inspired me to conduct research in this field.

Abstract

Studies have shown that the lack of suitable education opportunities for children with disabilities (CWDs) means that this marginalised group has a greater likelihood of falling into extreme poverty. This problem has been over-looked by mainstream development theory and policy-makers. One way in which this issue can be brought to the forefront is through lobby and advocacy. In this vein, Sabatello and Schulze argue that *'the rise of transnational civil society...(has) significantly strengthened the national and international discourse on disability'* (2013:1). Additionally, scholarship has not explored the way in which the Political Opportunity Structure Theory (POS) can explain how non-Western Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) achieve certain achievements as a result of lobby and advocacy work.

Taking this knowledge gap into consideration, this paper explains how the Cameroonian POS shaped lobby and advocacy strategies and outcomes for CWDs. The research focused on the work of one advocacy programme named SEEPD which aims to provide equal and fair education opportunities for CWDs in Cameroon. This study was purposive and semi-structured interviews, focus groups discussions, power-mapping and H-Diagrams were conducted with SEEPD, education authorities and beneficiaries.

The findings of this thesis found that SEEPD mainly achieved legislative outcomes with Anglophone power-holders through direct lobby and advocacy strategies such as meetings and workshops. Data collected specifically highlighted that opportunities for lobby and advocacy were mainly created by decentralisation and the reduced capacity of power-holders. This study found that dimensions of the POS are not mutually exclusive as hypothesised by recent scholarship as partial decentralisation in Cameroon reduced the capacity of power-holders. Overall, the findings explain how certain characteristics of the POS facilitated legislative achievements for CWDs but also hindered actual practice of policies that benefitted this disadvantaged group. Consequently, this showed that easy access does not necessarily equate to easy lobby and advocacy wins.

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms	6
Chapter 1: Introduction	7
1.1 Disability and International Development.....	7
1.2 The Political Opportunity Structure.....	10
1.3 Research Question.....	10
Chapter 2: Conceptual Scheme and Theoretical Framework	12
2.1 Conceptual Scheme.....	12
2.2 Social Movement Theory and SEEPD.....	13
2.3 Outcomes.....	13
2.4 Strategy and Power Holders.....	16
2.5 The Political Opportunity Structure Theory.....	17
2.6 Extended Conceptual Scheme and Sub-Questions.....	20
Chapter 3: Research Design	22
3.1 Units of Analysis and Sampling.....	22
3.2 Epistemology and Ontology.....	24
3.3 Research Methods.....	25
3.4 Data Analysis.....	32
3.5 Ethical Considerations.....	32
3.6 Limitations.....	33
Chapter 4: Context	36
4.1 Research Location.....	36
4.2 Colonisation.....	37
4.3 Post-Colonial Order.....	38
4.4 Economy.....	42
4.5 Disability in Cameroon.....	43
4.6 Conclusions.....	44
Chapter 5: The Programme for the Socio Economic Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (SEEPD)	45
5.1 Cameroon Baptist Convention.....	45
5.2 Phase 1 (2009-2011).....	48
5.3 Phase 2 (2012-2014).....	56
5.4 Phase 3 (2015-2018).....	61
5.5 Conclusions.....	67
Chapter 6: SEEPD and The Political Opportunity Structure	71
6.1 Sensitisation of Power-holders.....	71
6.2 Authorisation and Implementation of Inclusive Education in the Pilot Schools.....	75
6.3 Improved Examination Conditions for CWDs.....	78
6.4 Partnerships with Councils.....	80
6.5 Conclusions.....	83

Chapter 7: Conclusions	86
7.1 Introduction	86
7.2 Conclusions and Findings	87
7.3 Policy Recommendations	93
7.4 Reflections	94
Appendices	96
Appendix 1 Operationalization Table	96
Appendix 2: List of Participants	104
Appendix 3: Interview Guides	109
Appendix 4: Power-Maps	115
Appendix 5: Council Documentation	117
Bibliography	122

List of Figures

Figure 1. Basic Conceptual Scheme	12
Figure 2. Extended Conceptual Scheme	21
Figure 3. Map of SEEPD Intervention Sites	24
Figure 4. Summary of Research Methods	26
Figure 5. Example of Power-Map	29
Figure 6. Example of H-Diagram	30
Figure 7. Literacy Rates by Region	36
Figure 8. Political Parties in Parliament	40
Figure 9. Overview of SEEPD	47
Figure 10. Overview of Problems, Activities and Powerholders in Phase 1	49
Figure 11. Overview of Problems, Activities and Powerholders in Phase 2	56
Figure 12. H-Diagrams	59
Figure 13. GCE Board Policies	60
Figure 14. Overview of Problems, Activities and Powerholders in Phase 3	62
Figure 15. Councils in the Northwest Supporting CWDs through Policy	63
Figure 16. Councils in the Northwest Supporting CWDs through MoUs and Action Plans ..	64
Figure 17. Overall Strategies and Outcomes for SEEPD, 2016	69

List of Acronyms

APWDS	Association of Persons with Disabilities
CBC	Cameroon Baptist Convention
CBC-HS	Cameroon Baptist Convention-Health Services
CBR	Community Based Rehabilitation
CBM	Christian Blind Mission
CIS	Centre for Inclusive Studies
CRPD	UN Convention on Disability Rights
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CWDs	Children with Disabilities
ESRC	Economic and Social Research Council
GBHS	Government Bilingual High School
ICG	International Crisis Group
IE	Inclusive Education
LEA	Local Education Authorities (Regional authorities: Divisional Delegates, Sub-Divisional Delegates, Pedagogic Inspectors, Head-teachers and Principals)
MINAS	Ministry of Social Welfare
MoE	Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education/Ministry of National Education (Basic and Secondary)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
POS	Political Opportunity Structure
PWDs	Persons with Disabilities
SAJOCAH	Saint Joseph's Children and Adults Home
SENTTI	Special Education Needs Teacher Training Institute
SEEPD	Socio Economic Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities
SMO	Social Movement Organisation
WINHEEDCAM	Women's Initiative for Health Education and Economic Development
UN	United Nations

Word Count: 26, 480 (Max: 27,500)

Chapter 1: Introduction

Despite being classified as the largest minority group with a greater likelihood of falling into extreme poverty, people with disabilities (PWDs) are frequently forgotten from mainstream development theory and policy-making. The current laws created by states and intergovernmental organisations do not sufficiently protect PWDs from discrimination nor do they offer equal and fair opportunities. However, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have done much to change this and there have been gradual changes with more governments agreeing to ratify the UN Convention on Disability Rights. The Cameroon Baptist Convention-Health Service (CBC-HS) is a civil society organisation with a track record of lobby and advocacy campaigns for PWDs, notably in the field of inclusive education. This study will investigate how the political context influences the lobby and advocacy work of CBC-HS's, SEEPD Programme. This programme seeks to promote inclusive education for children with disabilities (CWDs).

1.1 Disability and International Development

The link between disability and extreme poverty has never been so evident. However, policy-makers in the field of development have only recently brought this integral issue to the forefront and the Millennium Development Goals failed to mention the need to provide opportunities for those living with a disability. The lack of policy on this matter has only aggravated the situation. The UNDP highlighted that 80% of the world's disabled people live in '*developing countries*' (UN, 2012:1). Comparative studies on disability legislation have shown that only 45 countries worldwide have anti-discrimination and other disability-specific laws (United Nations, 2012:1). PWDs in low income countries are affected by the same factors which cause poverty for others but also face greater disadvantages caused by their disability (UN, 2012:1).

Marginalisation and discrimination faced by PWDs are typically rooted in prejudices such as the underestimation of the potential of the individual, harmful stereotyping, and the lack of knowledge or simply fear of disability. In many societies, different cultural beliefs can additionally enforce stigmas leading to exclusion and neglect as well as physical abuse. These challenges prohibit PWDs from being included by their families, community and society. Furthermore, discrimination has resulted in severely low employment opportunities

for PWDs. Europa (2011) estimates that within the EU only 47% of people with ‘*basic activity*’ are employed. Overall, most PWDs remain excluded by society and endure economic hardships. Consequently, there is a great need for inclusive solutions which provide fair and equal opportunities for PWDs to be economically and socially integrated.

1.1.1 Disability and Inclusive Education

Providing equal and fair education opportunities to CWDs is an important way to break the vicious cycle of extreme poverty and exclusion. The UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (UN:2015) have finally pushed the issue of inclusion for PWDs to the forefront. The SDGs acknowledged the varying needs for PWDs in goals 4, 10, 11 and 17. Goal 4 specifically mentions the need to practice inclusive education as it provides ‘*equal and accessible education*’ (UN:2015) to all. However, whilst gender inequality and poverty were presented in their own goal, there is still no single goal dedicated to mainstreaming disability in state education institutions. Therefore, a better understanding of how we can ensure that CWDs get the education they deserve is of key relevance to the academic field of international development, NGOs and governments.

CWDs in countries with low economic development are more likely to be integrated into government schools if states practice inclusive education. UNESCO (2009) defines inclusive education as follows:

*Inclusive education (IE) should be viewed in terms of **including traditionally excluded or marginalised groups** or making the invisible visible. The most marginalised groups are often invisible in society: **disabled children**, girls, children in remote villages, and the very poor. These invisible groups are excluded from **governmental policy and access to education***

For CWDs, inclusion requires government schools to mainstream disability through providing universal building access in schools, investing in low technologies such as recorders, training teachers to cater and identify CWDs and making changes in the curriculum and examination process e.g. braille examination scripts.

1.1.2 Lobby and Advocacy

One way in which inclusive education for CWDs can be brought to the forefront is through

lobby and advocacy. CSOs have played a vital role in influencing power-holders to implement policies that facilitates the inclusion of CWDs and PWDs. In their study on disability rights, Sabatello and Schulze argue that *‘the rise of transnational civil society...has significantly strengthened the national and international discourse on the issue.’* (2013: 1).

This study seeks to offer an enhanced understanding of the lobby and advocacy efforts in the field of inclusive education. The significance of studying lobby and advocacy for inclusive education is twofold. Firstly, there has been little research in the field of lobby and advocacy of CSOs in non-Western contexts (Guo and Zhang, 2014) especially that concerning inclusive education. Overall, the factors that explain the success of lobby & advocacy for marginalised groups remain poorly understood. Secondly, an enhanced understanding of the factors shaping lobby and advocacy success is pivotal for creating more effective strategies.

This research also aims to have practical relevance, as it is part of a broader project with the African Studies Centre (ASC) in Leiden and the Dutch NGO, the Liliane Foundation which seeks to promote the rights of CWDs worldwide. The project “Breaking down Barriers to Inclusion – Building Capacity for Lobby and Advocacy for Children with Disabilities”, seeks to understand the factors that determine the success of lobby and advocacy and focuses on strengthening local civil society partners of the Liliane Foundation and the foundation itself. Over the next four years several master theses will collect data and try to shed light on various relevant aspects related to lobby and advocacy for CWDs.

1.1.3 Inclusive Education in Cameroon

Based in the Anglophone town Bamenda, the CBC-HS is a CSO that works in partnership with the Liliane Foundation. CBC-HS describe themselves as a *‘faith-based healthcare organisation’* (CBC-HS, Website) that also engages with projects that tackle extreme poverty as well as offering chaplaincy services. One particular activity carried out by CBC-HS is the programme for the “Socio Economic Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities” (SEEPD). This programme aims to implement inclusive education in the Northwest region of Cameroon. SEEPD’s work primarily consists of advocating for inclusive education practices that will benefit CWDs, their carers and the wider community. SEEPD works with government schools, the General Certificate of Education Board (GCE Board) who are responsible for Anglophone examinations, teacher training colleges as well as involving

parents or guardians of CWDs in these processes.

Cameroon was an ideal location to conduct this study as there is growing civil society action to improve the quality of lives of PWDs. Whilst Cameroon passed a law in 2010 that promoted the protection of PWDs, *'the biggest challenge is at the level of implementing those policies'* (Children of the Earth: 2007). The state of Cameroon has not yet ratified the universal declaration of disability rights which would be a key step towards building sustainable gains for PWDs and CWDs. Within the context of Cameroon, CWDs have been marginalised especially in the field of education. It has been noted that *'Cameroonian society still sees people with disabilities as a liability, and as people who need charity'* (The Guardian: 2011). This has led to a lack of opportunities for CWDs to study in mainstream settings and it has been reported that only 2% of disabled people in Cameroon have received formal education (The Guardian, 2011).

1.2 The Political Opportunity Structure Theory (POS)

Within the field of civil society and non-profit studies, there is little theorising on lobby and advocacy. As such, this study makes use of social movement theory to examine advocacy for inclusive education in Cameroon. In particular, it employs the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) theory which argues that success or failure of lobby and advocacy is primarily affected by political opportunities. Political opportunities refer to those aspects of the political system that affect the possibilities for social movements or CSOs to mobilise and achieve outcomes. By using POS-theory it becomes possible to systematically analyse and understand the ways in which the political environment of the SEEPD-Programme has enabled and hindered its ability to achieve success.

1.3 Research Question

This study specifically focuses on how the nature of the political context in Cameroon enables and constrains SEEPD's ability to achieve outcomes through lobby and advocacy. The SEEPD-Programme from its start in 2009 till the time of research (February 2016) will act as the focal point of this study. Hence, the central research question will be:

How did the Cameroonian political opportunity structure shape the SEEPD-Programme's ability to achieve lobby and advocacy outcomes in the period between 2009-March 2016?

The outline of this thesis is as follows:

Chapter 2) Theoretical Framework

Chapter 3) Research Design

Chapter 4) Context

Chapters 5) The Programme for the Socio Economic Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (SEEPD)

Chapter 6) SEEPD and The Political Opportunity Structure

Chapter 7) Conclusion

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

This chapter outlines the conceptual scheme and theoretical framework used to examine advocacy for inclusive education in Cameroon. It is based on a literature review of social movement theory and situates integral components of the research question into ongoing academic debates. Besides dividing the main question into sub-questions, the chapter also offers an operationalisation of key concepts into practical indicators. Additionally, the operationalisation of key terms will take into consideration the Cameroonian context.

2.1 Conceptual Scheme

Building on social movement theory, the conceptual scheme (see Figure 1.) visualises how the political opportunity structure can influence lobby and advocacy outcomes. It shows that outcomes are dependent on a social movement organisation's (SMO) ability to change the behaviour of power-holders through direct engagement and/or through indirect engagement using allies and the opinion of the general public. The following sections discuss the various elements of the conceptual scheme in greater detail and Appendix 1. presents the operationalisation table which fully breaks down key terms and concepts from the main research question.




Figure 1. Basic Conceptual Scheme

2.2 Social Movement Theory and SEEPD

This study uses social movement theory (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2009:22-23) to understand and explain the success of lobby and advocacy. SMOs can be defined as organisations *'seeking to alter power deficits and to effect social transformation through the state by mobilising regular citizens.'* (Amenta et al, 2010:288) The SEEPD-Programme which is the focus of this study clearly fits this definition as their objective is to advocate for *'for the inclusion of people with disabilities in all aspects of community life.'* (SEEPD, 2015) Hence, social movement theory is appropriate for this study and the SEEPD-Programme will be conceptualised as an SMO in this study.

2.3 Outcomes

Prior to operationalising any other components of the conceptual scheme, it is necessary to start with outcomes as most social movement theorists examine outcomes in relation to a movement's objectives. Amenta et al. (2010) argue that the outcomes of social movements are best understood from a framework focused around state policy-making and political change. They argue that social movements are ultimately *'seeking to alter power deficits and to effect social transformation through the state by mobilising regular citizens'*. This study follows this approach and examines outcomes in relation to state-policy making.

This perspective has been adopted by Andrews and Edwards (2004) who group political outputs of a social movement into five different aspects of the policy process: agenda setting, access to decision-making arenas, achieving favourable policies, monitoring and shaping implementation, and shifting the long-term priorities and resources of political institutions. Gamson (1990) adds an additional dimension arguing that a movement's outcome can be defined as *'being accepted as a member of the polity (...) and gaining new advantages (i.e. having institutional access)'* (Oliver et al., 2003:218).

This study utilised Kolb's (2007) categorisation of outcomes as it synthesises recent scholarly work on the outcomes of social movements. Kolb (2007:275) argues that there are two types of lobby and advocacy outcomes: substantive outcomes and institutional outcomes. Substantive outcomes refer to the changes that benefit the target/disadvantaged group in question during the policy making process. This categorisation of outcomes can be understood as follows:

1) Agenda Outcome: This outcome occurs when a SMO succeeds in bringing greater attention and creating urgency around its aims and objectives. Kolb (2007:28) outlines that the agenda impact is often the initial outcome gained and it is typically the most achievable outcome for SMOs. When researching agenda outcomes, it is necessary to consider to what extent the power-holder is aware of the SMO's demand.

2) Alternatives Outcome: This refers to what Kolb (2007:28) describes as '*the extent to which movements are able to influence the content of policy proposals*'. An example of an alternatives outcome could include a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the SMO and the state.

3) Policy Outcome: This refers to situations when a SMO has succeeded to convince the government to implement a new policy in line with its demands. As such, it is about the adoption of new legislation or other form of binding political decisions due to the efforts of an SMO.

4) Implementation Outcome: This outcome recognises that states or power-holders may adopt new policies, but not necessarily implement them (properly) in practice. This outcome considers to what extent power-holders are successfully practicing the MoU, policy or law which they agreed to implement.

5) Collective Outcome: Kolb (2007:28) understands this outcome as the positive changes resulting from the actual implementation of policies. The question here is whether collective benefits have been produced for the target/disadvantaged group in question.

Kolb's second categorisation of outcomes are institutional outcomes. This refers to the ways in which policies are developed, adopted and implemented. The following explains three distinct institutional outcomes:

Procedural Outcomes: These are achieved when a power-holder changes its formal relation with the SMO in question. It is about the SMO gaining acceptance in the eyes

of the power holder in question. In some cases, the SMO may even get formal recognition as a legitimate spokesman for a disadvantaged/target group.

Institutional Outcome: This occurs when an SMO succeeds in ensuring that a disadvantaged group becomes part of the procedures of formal decision-making. For example, SMOs may succeed in ensuring that it becomes standard practice to involve disabled people and their organisations during policy design meetings or by giving them greater voting rights.

State Transformation Outcome: This is the most demanding outcome and occurs when SMOs succeed in creating new political institutions such as a government department for the disadvantaged group in question.

Examining the outcomes of social movements is seldom straightforward and Kolb (2007) highlights that when analysing the outcomes of SMOs it is necessary to consider the following limitations:

1. Power-holders may engage in symbolic politics or cheap talk. They can make promises in order to please an SMO without having the intention of implementing the agreed promise.
2. There can be a time lag between an SMO's lobby and advocacy work and actual change in policy which causes SMOs to '*ultimately lose whatever political change they had achieved*' (Kolb, 2007:22) as the daily context may no longer be relevant.
3. Demonstrating causality between the lobby and advocacy work of an SMO and policy change is difficult. If power-holders change their policy, this may be the result of a variety of other factors and actors.

2.4 Strategy and Power-Holders

Figure 1. illustrates that outcomes are a result of a specific set of actions or strategy which change the behaviour of decision-makers (power-holders). In this study, strategy is defined as the way in which or how SMOs pursue their goals with certain tactics or activities (Kolb, 2007:45-46) in order to achieve outcomes as described in the aforementioned section. Following the logic according to the conceptual scheme, the purpose of strategy is to align and influence the behaviour of power-holders to the SMO's objectives.

As shown in the conceptual scheme (Figure 1.), the strategy of an SMO can either be in the form of direct or indirect tactics. Smiley (2010:58) explains that direct strategy includes three elements:

- 1) Expressing a point of a view on a specific piece of legislation
- 2) Direct communication to a legislator, their staff or an involved government employee
- 3) Requesting an action e.g. to support, oppose or amend a policy

Additionally, SMOs use indirect strategy in order to influence or change the behaviour of power holders via actors such as the general public and allies. Indirect strategy has also been described by Miley as *'expressing a point of view on a piece of legislation and seeking to influence others (the public) to take specific actions'* (2010:58). This concept has been further explored by Lipsky (1968) who claims that SMOs can activate *'third parties'* to enter the implicit or explicit bargaining arena in favourable ways to the SMO in question. Hence, SMOs can mobilise the opinion of the general public in order to influence the behaviour of power-holders and achieve outcomes.

Meyer and Staggenborg (2012:4-18) state that when studying the lobby and advocacy strategy of an SMO, it is important to consider the following elements:

1. ***Demands of the SMO:*** What are the changes that SMO wishes to see in the behaviour of power holders?
2. ***Arena of their action:*** Where does the SMO issue their demands and implement its tactics? Where does lobby and advocacy take place?
3. ***Tactics applied:*** What activities does the SMO employ to reach its goal?
4. ***Interactions with other stakeholders:*** With whom does the SMO interact with to

achieve its goal (e.g. authorities, supporters, opponents, media, allies)?

Furthermore, the conceptual scheme illustrates that outcomes require power-holders to change their behaviour. Power-holders are defined in this study as those actors who have the decision-making authority to enable, block or at least delay the desired policy change (Busby, 2010: 56). Power-holders can exist at different levels, ranging from the local to the national level. This study does not examine international power-holders.

2.5 The Political Opportunity Structure Theory

In social movement theory, the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) approach has been developed in order to understand how features of a political system can explain the different strategies and outcomes of SMOs. The basic underlying notion of the POS Theory is that the strategy and outcomes of SMOs are to a large extent dependent on the existence or lack of political opportunities.

Whilst most scholars would agree that the above statement summarises the general approach of Political Opportunity Structure Theory, there appears to be disagreements concerning *'the exact nature of the approach's analytical core'* (Xie and Van der Heijen, 2010:53). This theoretical framework develops the ideas promoted by Xie and Van der Heijen (2010) and expands upon it with the work of several other POS theorists. It starts from the notion that the extent to which a political regime offers opportunities to SMOs depends on four regime characteristics which are as follows:

1. Formal Institutional Structures (open–closed).
2. Informal Elite Strategies (integrative–exclusive).
3. Configuration of Actors (Power) (divided elite–united elite).
4. Political Output Structure (weak–strong).

The first characteristic, the formal institutional structure, refers to how open the political system is for SMOs. Tarrow and Tilly (1996) argue that the openness of a political system is important as *'people act on opportunities'*. The more open a political system is, the easier it is for SMOs to engage with power-holders and express the need for their demands to be fulfilled. A system is considered to be more open when *'political decisions are dispersed'* (Xie

and Van der Hejen, 2010:53). The more “access points” SMOs have to engage the government, the more opportunities they have to be successful. To summarise, SMOs have a greater chance of achieving outcomes when *‘more political decisions are dispersed’* (Xie and Van der Hejen, 2010: 53) as power is shared among a greater number of power-holders which in turn offers SMOs a greater chance to permeate the system.

The openness of the political system, or alternatively, the number of access points available to SMOs to engage with power-holders, are closely related to these key characteristics of the political system:

1. The degree of territorial decentralisation between the national, the regional and the local level. The more decentralised a political system is, the more opportunities exist at different levels for SMOs to exert their influence.
2. The nature of the electoral system (one-party system, majority system, system of proportional representation). The more parties in an electoral system, the more opportunities or access points for SMOs to gain allies in their cause.

Secondly, informal Elite Strategies consider how power-holders typically and historically react to SMOs and their activities (Xie and Van der Hejen, 2010; Tarrow, 1994). Kriesi (1992) explains that the strategies that power-holders use to deal with SMO demands range between exclusion and assimilation. The more power-holders are geared towards exclusion (repression), the more difficult it is for SMOs to be successful. Xie and Van der Hejen (2010:54) argue that authoritarian regimes *‘are inclined to repress social movements, whereas representative ones tend to facilitate them.’* Flam (1994) has argued that countries that are young democracies tend to fear or repress actors who challenge the state. They also tend to respond to such challengers with authoritative enforcement issued by the police or army (Flam, 1994: 348). Kriesi (1992) considers that the greater the informal facilitation of access and the less the state resorts to repression, the more successful challengers will be.

Moreover, Kolb (2007) argues that electoral empowerment can also influence the way in which power-holders respond to SMOs. The author argues *that ‘in times of electoral instability, protest cannot safely be ignored; but it often cannot be simply repressed either’* (2007:77). For Kolb (2007), the decision for power-holders to either repress or facilitate social movements depends on their personal preferences regarding the proposed policy

change and their desire to '*optimize future re-election chances*' (2007:77).

The third dimension is the configuration of actors. This term refers to the arrangement or organisation of power-holders and their allies. This aspect of the political opportunity structure has been liberally defined by scholars. Some authors have limited the configuration of actors to power-holders or the governing elite whilst others also include allies of power holders and the general public in their approach. This study considers two dimensions of this characteristic which are as follows:

- 1) Divisions/allegiances between power-holders in the government
- 2) Allies, opponents and bystanders of SMOs

Xie and Van der Hejen (2010) believe that this mechanism should consider to what extent power-holders are divided or united and/or whether allies can be found in the government. In addition, they argue that the government should not always be seen as a homogenous entity. As such, the state in its entirety cannot merely be defined as a friend or foe of the SMO as each actor has distinct motivations and objectives. SMOs may find allies in some parts of the government, while encountering fierce repression in other parts. Xie and Van der Hejen (2010) argue that the more divided power-holders are, the greater the opportunities are for SMOs to conduct lobby and advocacy and achieve outcomes.

Alternatively, Porte and Diani provide a broader definition of this characteristic of the POS theory as they believe that SMOs can '*find both allies and opponents*' (2006:210) but this is not limited to power-holders. The authors argue that the alliance structure of political actors can provide resources and opportunities for SMOs whilst opponents '*erode them*' (2006:210-11). Moreover, the authors note that it is also important to consider the importance of bystanders as they can also influence the ability or mobilisation of social movements. This has been noted in the conceptual scheme (Figure 1.) which shows how the general public can also influence the behaviour of power-holders.

The fourth variable is referred to as the political output structure. This dimension recognises that for power-holders to accept and implement SMO demands, they should have the capacity to do so. McAdam (1982) states that it is this characteristic of the POS framework which can make this specific theory applicable to different contexts.

Kitschelt (1994: 61) considers that political output structures '*represent the capacity*

of a country's institutions to satisfy group demands and redress their grievances through an appropriate policy response'. Kitschelt (1994) theorises that centralised states usually have stronger political output structures than decentralised states as resources are less likely to be limited. A stronger political output structure typically limits an SMO's ability to achieve outcomes as this type of structure reduces the ability of power-holders to meet the demands of SMOs. Hence, this would suggest that SMOs should capitalise on state actors that have the capacity to support the demands of the SMO in question.

Finally, an on-going debate in social movement literature is whether the POS Theory – which has been developed in the West for industrialised nations – is applicable in non-Western countries. The decision to follow Xia and Van der Hejen's (2010) framework was based on the fact that they have used the POS Theory with success when studying social movements in China. Nonetheless, this particular study is aware that POS theory has mainly been explored by western scholars and will bring limitations when applying the theory to Cameroon. Consequently, this theoretical model acknowledges that it is important to consider that politics in Africa tend to work differently to Western political systems. Moreover, it will be interesting to see whether this study affirms or disproves the universal relevance of the POS Theory.

2.6 Extended Conceptual Scheme and Sub-Questions

Figure 2. is an extended version of the analytical model that was introduced earlier which takes the above theoretical discussions into account.




Figure 2. Extended Conceptual Scheme

The introduction stated the following central research question of this study is as follows:

How did the Cameroonian political opportunity structure shape the SEEPD-Programme's ability to achieve lobby and advocacy outcomes in the period between 2009-March 2016?

Considering the theoretical framework and conceptual scheme of this research in relation to the main research question, the following sub-questions have been formulated which will help to answer the main question:

- 1) What **outcomes** have the SEEPD-Programme achieved with its lobby and advocacy strategy for inclusive education?
- 2) What **lobby and advocacy strategy** has the SEEPD-Programme employed to pursue outcomes?
- 3) What elements of the **political opportunity structure** influenced the SEEPD-Programme's lobby and advocacy strategy and subsequent outcomes?

Chapter 3: Research Design

In order to understand how the political opportunity structure influenced the lobby and advocacy efforts of the SEEPD-Programme, this study utilised a range of qualitative methods and made a number of research design choices. This chapter aims to shed light on these methods and design choices which was conducted during the period of January to March 2016 in Cameroon. The outline of the chapter is as follows:

- 3.1) Units of Analysis and Sampling
- 3.2) Epistemology and Ontology
- 3.3) Research Methods
- 3.4) Data Analysis
- 3.5) Ethical Considerations

3.1 Units of Analysis & Sampling

According to Channels, a study's unit of analysis is the '*who or what that is being studied*' (2006:41). Given this study's sub-questions, the units of analysis in this study are as follows:

- 1) The lobby & advocacy strategy employed by SEEPD
- 2) The outcomes achieved by SEEPD
- 3) The features of political system influencing the strategy used and outcomes achieved.

To examine the above, the study drew upon a range of data-sources including CBC-HS/SEEPD staff, beneficiaries of the SEEPD-Programme, relevant government staff, CWDs, carers of beneficiaries, school staff and allies of power-holders. In addition, the study made use of the project documentation concerning the SEEPD-Programme (narrative reports, log frames etc.)

Sampling for all data collection methods was purposive as participants and documents were deliberately chosen. The basis on which participants were chosen depended on their association with the SEEPD-Programme, their knowledge concerning Cameroon's administration for education or Cameroon's political system. In total, this research

conducted 58 Semi-Structured interviews, 2 Focus Group Discussions, 3 H-Diagrams, 3 Power-Mapping exercises and 1 World Cafe Workshop-. In addition, the SEEPD-Programme shared documentation such as reports to the Ministry of National Education (MoE) and Memorandums of Understandings that SEEPD signed with Councils-.

CBC-HS and their SEEPD-Programme acted as the gate-keeper for this study and they helped to facilitate access to two schools from their inclusive school pilot project. It was decided that the best way to analyse the implementation of SEEPD's pilot schools would be to compare a school where SEEPD had successfully implemented inclusive education to one that was less successful. It was necessary to ensure that both schools were similar in other respects such as size, location and type of school system otherwise such differences could influence the results of the study. In-depth, semi-structured interviews with the SEEPD staff, revealed that the most successful school in the pilot project was GBHS Bamenda whilst the least successful school was identified as GBHS Mbengwi. The schools were similar in most respects but it should be noted that GBHS Bamenda was located close to the SEEPD-Programme's headquarters and SEEPD's Education Advisor also worked as a teacher at this school. In addition, GBHS Mbengwi was located within a town with significantly smaller population. The following map illustrates where these pilot schools are located within the Northwest region.




Figure 3. Map of SEEPD Interventions

(Source: SEEPD, 2015)

The fieldwork was conducted alongside Sebastian Potthof, a fellow researcher whose study focused on CBC-HS's organisational capacity. Travelling by motorbike and working in a team helped to save time and facilitated access to difficult locations. The convenience in travel and working in team meant that it was possible to expand the sample size and triangulate data with more stakeholders and beneficiaries located in Buae and Yaoundé. The additional time also allowed for a visit to a pilot school established by the INGO Sight Savers which helped to compare the differences between SEEPD's self-described bottom-up lobby and advocacy approach to Sight Saver's top-down approach.

3.2 Epistemology and Ontology

This research was conducted from an interpretivist perspective as the ontological stance rejects the idea that a universal or objective truth can be discovered. Interpretivism in this study is to be understood as the following:

Access to reality (given or socially constructed) is only through social constructions such as

language, consciousness, shared meanings, and instruments. (Myers, 2008:39)

This study used the POS Theory in an explorative way and looked at whether certain POS-hypotheses could apply to Cameroon. Moreover, this research explicitly searched for explanations and relations between variables not predicted by POS Theory. By researching a multitude of actors, the data collected included varied perspectives on the role of the POS in explaining the SEEPD Programme's strategy and outcomes. All stakeholders' experiences and opinions were valued as relevant in the research but also accepted that they came with biases and limitations. Through triangulation, the study tried to identify the most significant patterns in the data in relation to the research questions.

3.3 Research Methods

Given the epistemological stance, this study engaged with qualitative mixed-methods that provided descriptive and explanatory findings. The study used a range of qualitative methods for data collection including field notes, project-documentation, semi-structured interviews, focus groups, power mapping (Net-Map), H-Diagrams, and the World Café Workshop. Figure 3., presents a table of the how the various data methods helped to answer the aforementioned research questions. The remainder of this section explains why these particular methods were utilised and how they were conducted in the field. Additionally, Appendix 2. presents a detailed list of participants who contributed to the study.

	Sub-Question 1 (Outcomes)	Sub-Question 2 (Strategy)	Sub-Question 3 (Political Opportunity Structure)
Documentation Study	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Reports - MoUs with Councils - GCE Board Policy Booklet 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Reports - Online newspaper articles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MoU with Councils - Online newspaper articles
Semi-structured Interviews	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Staff - CBC-HS Staff - Community Leaders - SEEPD stakeholders - CWDs and Parents - Staff at Pilot Schools - Civil servants - CBM (funder) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Staff - CBC-HS Staff - Community Leaders - SEEPD Stakeholders - CWDs and Parents - Staff at Pilot Schools - Civil servants - CBM (funder) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Staff - CBC-HS Staff - SEEPD Stakeholders - Staff at pilot schools - Civil servants - Site Savers (INGO for CWDs)
Focus Group Discussions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Senior staff - Community Leaders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Senior Staff - Community Leaders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community Leaders - SEEPD Senior Staff -
H-Diagrams	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Officers - Teachers (GBHS Bamenda) - Teachers (GBHS Mbengwi) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Officers - Teachers (GBHS Bamenda) - Teachers (GBHS Mbengwi) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Officers - Teachers (GBHS Bamenda) - Teachers (GBHS Mbengwi)
Power-Mapping	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Staff - SENTTI
Field Notes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All participants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All participants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All participants
World Café Worksop		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Staff - Representatives of local government actors - SEEPD Stakeholders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SEEPD Staff - Representatives of local government actors - SEEPD Stakeholders

Figure 4. Table to Summarise Research Design

Semi-Structured Interviews: The purpose of conducting semi-structured interviews¹ was to gain an in-depth perspective from a variety of stakeholders which included; CBC-HS/SEEPD staff, teachers, politicians, civil service workers, students, other SMO associated with disability rights and parents. Interviews were utilised in order to determine a timeline of SEEPD's strategies and outcomes during the period of 2009 – March 2016. In addition, interviews also helped to understand how power-holders and the POS can influence SEEPD's lobby and advocacy work. This notion has been supported by Lofland (1996:43) who explains that semi-structured interviews for SMOs are a '*straightforward way for researchers get to know an SMO*'. In order prepare for the interviews, it was necessary to prepare an interview guide and engage with preliminary readings of SEEPD's documentation. The data gathered from various reports and leaflets were used to help design the interview questions.

Focus Group Discussions: In order to differentiate and triangulate data from semi-structured interviews, it appeared to be logical to carry-out focus group discussions rather than focus group interviews. Focus Group Discussions were conducted with SEEPD staff, CWDs in the pilot schools and community leaders in Bamenda. The method used was that of Barbour (2008:2) who explains that this particular method relies on '*generating and analysing interaction between participants, rather than asking the same question (or list of questions) to each group participant in turn*'. Consequently, this technique generated interaction and a more open discussion about topics that were not suitable to broach in semi-structured interviews such as the political context and influencing power-holders. As this study analysed the SEEPD-Programme retrospectively, focus group discussions also helped to encourage participants recall on previous events through sharing memories others may have forgotten.

To implement Barbour's (2008:2) definition of focus group discussions it was decided that it would be best to introduce a topic² to a group of 4-8 people and encourage discussion. The discussions helped to determine the SEEPD Programme's lobby and advocacy tactics and outcomes. The facilitator also asked questions

¹ See Appendix 3.1 for interview guides

² See Appendix 3. 2 for discussion topics

concerning how power-holders have responded to SEEPD and how certain POS characteristics have enabled and constrained SEEPD.

H-Diagrams: This study utilized the H-diagram method presented by Inglis (1997) to help staff to directly engage with '*monitoring and evaluation exercises*' (1997:6).

Similar to Focus Group Discussions, this method helped participants to share memories but also required all participants to actively engage with conversation. H-Diagrams were conducted with teachers in the pilot schools and SEEPD officers.

Following the method outlined by Inglis (1997) a facilitator asked groups of 4-8 people to answer ranking questions regarding the research (see Figure.3). The participants noted their answer on a sticky note which was then placed on a scale of 1-10 on the H-Diagram. As highlighted by Figure 3., 1-5 indicates that the participant believed that SEEPD was not very successful (1 being the lowest) whilst 6-10 implies that the project successfully achieved their goals for inclusive education. The facilitator then asked each candidate to explain the reasons for their chosen ranking to the group. This was followed by a 10 to 15 minute discussion on topics related to the question. A note-taker was present in order to record findings from this method.




Figure 5: Example H-diagram used with SEEPD Staff

(Source: HD2)

Power-Mapping (Net Map): As power-holders and stakeholders played a pivotal role in the conceptual scheme outlined in Chapter 2, it seemed logical to use Power-Mapping or Net-Map, a dual method which comprises of ‘*social network analysis and the power mapping tool*’ (Waale, 2008:vi). This method was conducted with SEEPD staff and compared with SENTTI, a school that trains teachers inclusively and has conducted lobby and advocacy activities for inclusive education using a top-down approach.

Power-Mapping required the facilitator to ask each group to map out power relations using game figures. The facilitator then asked participants to what extent different actors can influence policy and practice on inclusive education within Cameroon (both at regional and national level). Participants then had to show the relation between each actor (e.g. do they create policy, provide money etc.). Board games were used to create “power-towers” (the taller the tower, the greater the power). This process provided a visual map of how SEEPD-Programme and SENTTI understand networks and power in relation to inclusive education. An example of a finished power-map can be seen below in Figure 6.




Figure 6. Example of Power-Map³ used with SEEPD Staff

(Source: PM1)

Field Notes: The purpose of field notes was to help supplement other forms of data collection and record daily discourses which may not be captured through formal modes of data collection. This particular study followed the method as explained by Tavakoli (2013) who notes that field notes comprise of *'brief notes made during the observation but which can later be expanded upon'* (2013:228). In addition, the field notes comprised of a descriptive part which included *'a complete description of the setting, the people and their reactions and interpersonal relationships'* (2013:228) whilst the reflective part considered *'the observer's personal impressions about the events, comments of the research method, decisions and problems, records of ethical issues and speculation about data analysis'* (2013:228). Field notes were taken regularly throughout the fieldwork period. These notes supported the research conducted by considering the everyday discourses and attitudes in regards to SEEPD's strategy, outcomes and whether their work is limited or enabled by the political system.

³ See Appendix 4. for all Power-Maps

SMO Publications: For the purpose of this study, it appeared to be appropriate to retrieve SEEPD's entire catalogue of publications in order to gain an overall understanding of the programme prior to conducting other data collection methods. SMO documentation also helped to confirm dates that participants could not recall during other data collection processes. In addition, the fieldwork process began by creating a timeline of the SEEPD-Programme's strategy and outcomes. This helped to visualise the link between strategy and output as well as providing background information that was required when it came to formulating questions for focus group discussions, H-Diagrams and semi-structured interviews. A full list of SEEPD documentation used for this study can be found in the bibliography.

The World Cafe Workshop: After all other data collection methods were completed, participants for this study and SEEPD staff were invited to discuss preliminary findings through participating in the World Café Workshop. This particular method was chosen as it is '*a simple yet powerful conversational process for fostering constructive dialogue*' (Brown and Isaacs, 2005: 3). This method began by presenting preliminary findings to research participants which was then followed by a general open discussion. After a short break, participants were separated into groups of four and one person within each group was elected table leader. Participants were asked to discuss and note down key points to questions asked by the facilitator. The facilitator asked a total of two questions, the one related directly to this study asked the following:

How could SEEPD make better use of opportunities in the political system and mitigate existing constraints?

After twenty minutes of discussion, all participants (except table heads) were asked to move to another table and answer the same question. Following two rounds of answering the question, table heads were asked to present their findings to all participants and the facilitator. The method ended with all participants engaging in a joint discussion regarding the question. Throughout this activity, a note taker was present and groups were asked to create a poster summarising their answers.

3.4 Data Analysis

Throughout the fieldwork process, data collected was transcribed and discussed with a local supervisor from The University of Buea. As the findings were qualitative, data from focus groups, H-Diagrams, field notes and semi-structured interviews were analysed using Atlas Ti starting with open coding and then axial coding. In the context of this specific study, coding is to be understood as defined by Houghton (2006). The author describes open coding as identifying '*categories of data and their related properties and dimensions*' (Houghton, 2006:88) This should help to see if there are any links between SEEPD's strategies, subsequent outcomes and the political context in which they work in. This was then followed by axial coding where the categories formed using open coding helped to identify causal relationships between POS theory and the strategy and related outcomes of the SEEPD-Programme. Strauss and Corbin (1990:97) agree that axial coding helps to understand the context and the conditions that create a certain category. Open coding started in the field during the World Café event where the preliminary findings were explained to participants.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

It was essential to explain to participants that the aim of this research is to understand how the political opportunity structure (or context) shapes SEEPD's strategy and outcomes. Participants were made aware that the data would be analysed as part of a master thesis and it would inform the future strategy of both CBC-HS and their partner, the Liliane Foundation. Participants were given the opportunity to stop at any point of the data collection process.

This study focuses on the political context which some may consider to be a sensitive topic considering Cameroon's history of corruption and censorship. Hence the information provided by participants was treated confidentially. No names or traceable quotations are featured in the thesis. Only when participants gave their consent, interviews were recorded for transcription purposes.

CWDs were participants of this project as they are beneficiaries of the SEEPD Programme. This particular study considered the ethical lessons presented by Bhopal and Deucher (2015) who specialise in conducting research with vulnerable or

marginalised groups. The authors emphasize the need to include marginalised groups in research processes as *'disabled people are always just around the corner-but never in the room'* (Bhopal and Deucher, 2015:92). The authors' main concern is that decisions regarding the research process do not sufficiently consider individual needs of PWDs which is required for them to act as participants. This study actively included persons with disabilities by focusing on beneficiaries in the pilot schools and other stakeholders that served the educational needs of persons with disabilities. Additionally, when conducting research, this study collaborated with SEEPD to ensure that any necessary needs such as wheelchair access, home visits and sign language translators were catered for.

It was also necessary to be especially cautious when working with children with developmental disabilities such as autism. This research followed the ethical advice provided by The Economic and Social Research Council who claim that the research relationship must be anticipated prior to collecting any data as people with disability are less likely to have social or professional networks (ESRC, 2008:6). The ESRC highlight that it is essential for researchers to also consider that some participants with disabilities may believe the researcher to be an intruder or close friend. Hence, it is necessary to ensure that participants have the competency to provide consent and fully understand what the research entails.

During this study a prior assessment was made in coordination with carers and guardians whether the participants' cognitive abilities may affect their capacity to consent or participate in the research. If this appeared to be the case, this study followed the advice of ESRC and ensured that guardians, carers or teachers were aware of the research and present in semi-structured interviews or focus group discussions with all CWDs. Their presence helped to protect the participant by ensuring that they understood the purpose of the research, their right to stop answering questions and that their identity would remain anonymous.

3.6 Limitations

The most significant limitation to this study was the difficulty in being able to create a historically accurate timeline of strategies and outcomes related to SEEPD's lobby and advocacy work for inclusive education. Although this study engaged with a range

of methods varying from FDGs and interviews to document study as well as triangulating data with various sources, it was not always possible to create a chronological order of strategies and related outcomes. This was due to several reasons; firstly the current SEEPD staff are relatively new and secondly it was not possible to obtain all documentation relating to outcomes due to confidentiality clauses established between SEEPD and their partners.

Although CBC-HS's connection to a variety of stakeholders helped to provide much needed access to key participants, it appeared to be that some participants were considerate of their relationship with the organisation when answering questions. Hence, it appeared to be that some participants did not feel completely confident to be openly critical of the SEEPD's work. Furthermore, at times, it was also difficult to encourage participants to talk openly and honestly about the political opportunity structure in Cameroon, especially when it came to discussing the "process" of decentralisation within the country.

In addition, group dynamics during these activities also limited the extent to which some participants engaged with group discussions. Due to the nature of workplace hierarchies or gender disparities, it was sometimes difficult to fully engage with all participants. Although this study carefully considered the dynamics of group compositions and changed the activity from focus groups discussions to H-Diagrams, it was not always possible to prevent this limitation. Whilst, this did not massively influence results, it should be recognised that on occasion certain participants did not fully immerse themselves in the activity due to the nature of the group.

Although not a major problem, some participants had trouble understanding research methods such as Power-Mapping (net map) and H-Diagrams. Nonetheless, this was easily resolved by simplifying questions and using example videos in order to explain complex activities.

Finally, the research period was too short to study the entire Cameroonian political context. Consequently, this research initially decided to limit the study to the political opportunity system within the Northwest region as a preliminary aim. However, given the centralised nature of the Cameroonian governing system and due to additional time, the research incorporated national aspects of the political

system that affected SEEPD's lobby and advocacy work for inclusive education. However, time limitations meant that data could not be collected from all regions of Cameroon. Thus, the research was limited to the Northwest, Southwest and Littoral regions where key stakeholders associated with inclusive education were located.

Chapter 4: Context

The main research question considers how the political opportunity structure influences SEEPD’s ability to conduct lobby and advocacy for inclusive education. In order to sufficiently answer the main research question, it is necessary to provide a succinct overview of the current socio-economic and political situation in Cameroon through an analysis of Cameroon’s colonial and post-colonial history, economy and the state’s stance on issues pertaining to disability. In addition, this chapter provides a brief narrative of the Baptist movement in Cameroon as the focus of this study is SEEPD which operates under the Cameroon Baptist Convention.

4.1 Overview of Research Location

Cameroon is particularly suited to this study due to the complex nature of the political system combined with the increasing presence of social movement organisations for inclusive education. Founded in 1961, after both the British and French parts united together to fight for independence, Cameroon is often described as “Africa in Miniature” due to its rich cultural and geographical diversity. Located in West Africa, Cameroon is sparsely populated with approximately 22.5 million civilians living within 475.000m² (CIA, 2016).



Figure 7. Regional and Linguistic Map of Cameroon

(Source: Aaker, 2016)

Cameroon is organised as a presidential republic with a dominant party system and divided into ten semi-autonomous regions. Figure 7. shows that the regions are the Extreme North; North; Adamawa; Central; East; South; Littoral; West; South-west and North-West. The latter two are the official Anglophone regions while the other eight are Francophone making Cameroon a bilingual country with English and French as the official languages. Regions are further divided into 58 divisions, each division comprises of subdivisions and each subdivision contains districts which are the smallest administrative unit (CIA, 2016). Sub-divisions and districts are managed by local Councils

4.2 Colonisation

For the purpose of this study, it is necessary to consider Cameroon's diverse colonial history as the country has '*behind it three colonial experiences which came into play in the nationalist movements, namely German, British and French.*' (Fanso, 1999). This array of European colonisers began with German settlers entering the country in 1884 and making significant investments in the country's infrastructure. After Germany's loss in World War I, the state of Kamerun was then under British and French control. The colonial influence has given way to what Oluwu describes as a '*post-colonial order*' (Oluwu, 1995). Hence, it would be logical to begin with a brief analysis of the country's colonial past paying special attention to the development of the Baptist movement which can explain the origins of CBC-HS and SEEPD.

From 1884 to 1919 the German protectorate implemented infrastructural development, exploited resources and accelerated the Baptist movement. Baptist work itself was introduced in the late nineteenth century by Jamaican Joseph Merrick who was inspired by '*love for his African hegemony*' (CBC-HS, 2016) to spread the Baptist faith in Africa. Following the ascent of the German rule in Cameroon, the Baptist movement continued to flourish until the end of their mandate whereby the North American Baptists came to bolster their efforts. The German Mission officially ended in 1941 but the work of the Americans furthered their legacy until 1954. The work of the Baptists continued in both the Francophone and Anglophone regions but by 1947 the work was coordinated from Bamenda in

the Northwest region.

After Germany's loss in the "Kameron Campaign", 80% of the former Kameron was handed to France whilst the remainder was handed to Great Britain. It has been argued by Nfi (2005) that the artificial nature of this border led to serious consequences as *'each fraction was placed in an area of jurisdiction of two distinct and new socio-economic and political systems far removed from the whole culture'* (Nfi, 2005:340). This partition led to the creation of two distinct nationalist identities (Southern Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon) but both territories shared a united aim to *'ending partition and establishing a united independent Cameroon.'* (Fanso, 1999:281).

This aspiration became a reality by October 1961 following the results of the UN organised plebiscite. The citizens of Anglophone Cameroon were already divided about their independence, consequently the territories were treated as separate entities for the purpose of the plebiscite. Those belonging to the Northern Anglophone Cameroon decided to achieve independence by joining Nigeria and became the Saradauna Province whilst the Southern Cameroonians opted to stay with Francophone Cameroon.

Nonetheless, the context to which Cameroon became united was that of *'extensive violence'* as independence came in what the International Crisis Groups describes as a *'near civil war'* (ICG, 2010:1). This was followed by lengthy periods of instability which was masked by state development *'at the expense of pluralism'* (ICG, 2010:1). The failure to incorporate minority groups within this transition led to a situation of widespread discontent where frequent attempts of political reform have been rejected by the elite of the post-colonial order.

4.3 The Post-Colonial Order

This section will explore the post-independence political context specifically focusing on what Oluwu (1995) describes as Cameroon's "post-colonial order". The repercussions of the Picot Provisional Partition created what Fonchingon describes as *'disintegrative elements like ethnocentrism, clientelism, corruption, bribery, regionalism, nepotism, sloganeering, patronage and neo-patrimonialism'* (33:2004). It has been widely acknowledged that the Cameroonian state has favoured power

hegemony over strengthening national interests or unifying Cameroon's diverse ethnic and linguistic groups. Even with the introduction of democratic measures such as multi-partism and decentralisation, political theorists still contend that the populace has shown disinterest in the current state machinery (Fonchingong, 2004:35)

4.3.1 Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon

Gros has emphasised that the division between Anglophones and Francophones is one problem '*amid the complex cleavages that cut across Cameroonian society*' (1995). Linguistic differences have acted as one of the key issues preventing Cameroon from coherently forming one united national identity which is needed in order for the state to become a fully functioning democracy under the current administrative system. It appears to be that these two contesting nationalisms are the driving force behind the gradual (or superficial) democratic changes in Cameroon's political structure.

Critics of the current status quo argue that the '*Francophone leadership appear to accept what it can no longer prevent*' (Fanso, 294:1999). Due to Anglophone resistance and international pressure, the predominantly Francophone Cameroonian political elite (the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement) have come to introduce democratic measures such as multi-partism and decentralisation. However, the slow and partial implementation of these reforms remains to be highly controversial topic and a reflection of President Biya's party desire to remain in power.

This division has also infiltrated the education system. Despite attempts at uniting both systems, East Cameroonians tend to follow a French based model (Baccalauréat) whilst West Cameroonians continue to follow the British model (GCE Board). However, there is an overall rise in English speaking schools as English is perceived as more profitable language (Delancy, 2010:70). Chapter 6 will discuss in further detail how Anglophone resilience led to the creation of the semi-autonomous GCE Board and the effect this has had on SEEPD's work.

4.3.2 Multi-Partism

It has been argued by Atanga (2011), that multi-partism was a result of the pressure from Anglophone nationalists. In 1990, multi-party politics were formally legalised and the first Presidential election took place in October 1992. The events leading up to this democratic transition illustrate the importance of the Anglophone minority in pushing towards democratic reforms in Cameroon. A notable example would be the efforts of Anglophone nationalist John Fru Ndi whose promotion of Anglophone interests in the political sphere were recognised in the 1992 presidential elections where he came second and won 30% of the electorate.

<i>Political Group</i>	<i>Total</i>
Cameroon People's Democratic Movement	148
Social Democratic Front	18
National Union for Democracy and Progress	5
Cameroon Democratic Union	4
Union of the Peoples of Cameroon	3
Movement for the Defence of the Republic	1
Cameroon Renaissance Movement	1

Figure 8. Political Parties in Parliament

(Source: IPU, 2013)

Figure 8. shows that politics in the country is still dominated by one party which is the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM). Nkwi agrees that since the acceptance of the 1990 law, democracy has '*gone only as far as the political ritual of holding elections*' (2006:95). Currently, the CPDM hold the majority of seats in Parliament, the biggest opposition party is the Anglophone based Social Democratic Front. Whilst the political parties mirror the tensions between Anglophones and Francophones, Fonchingong (2004:33-35) would argue that the lack of coordination between the SDF and other groups have led to the CPDM's continued dominance.

Therefore, any civil society group wishing to change policy through Parliament must acknowledge that the political sphere is largely dominated by the ruling party whilst the stronghold party for Anglophones continues to be less

significant in national politics.

4.3.3 (De)Centralisation

The Gaullist movement had taken reign in Cameroon as it manifested in the form of *'a strong central state authority'* (ICG, 2010:6). The centralised administration has helped the CPDM maintain their grip on state control. The International Crisis Group (2010) argue that centralisation has proved to be ineffective in Cameroon as the ruling elite failed to unite emerging powers due to poor observance of the rule of law and adhering to the *'pre-war indigénat law'* (ICG, 2010:12). This law facilitated state institutions to treat Cameroonians unequally and led to a crisis of faith in the government.

As a way to delineate from Cameroon's post-colonial order and revitalise the relationship between the populace and the state, Cheka (2007) believes that decentralisation could be an opportunity *'to bring the government closer to its people'*. Although, Cameroonian law actively promotes decentralisation Fonchingon argues that *'the bureaucratic emphasis still remains largely centralised despite the discourses on decentralisation'* (2004:34).

In 2004, the Law on decentralisation stated that the 338 communes of Cameroon are responsible for *'the management, equipment and maintenance of pre-schools and primary schools'* This current law derives from Article 55 of Cameroon's constitution which states the following:

Decentralised local entities of the Republic shall be regions and councils (...) decentralised local authorities shall be legal entities recognised by public law. They shall enjoy administrative and financial autonomy in the management of local interests. They shall be freely administered by boards elected in accordance with conditions laid down by law (Law No. 96/06 of 18/1/96).

The extent to which decentralisation has been implemented and its necessity for lobby and advocacy in the field of Inclusive Education will be further explored in Chapters 5 and 6.

4.3.4 Civil Society

By the end of the 20th century civil society in Cameroon gained greater influence in Cameroon. Nkwi (2010:138) considers that the greatest challenge for Cameroonian CSOs involves encouraging citizens *'to take responsibility for their individual and collective destinies'*. CSOs also have the additional burden of successfully achieving their aims in a country that encompasses a range of societal cleavages which has placed limitations of their *'ability to mobilise all'* (Nkwi, 2006:91). Nkwi (2006) considers that ethnocentrism, regionalism and elitism have prevented CSOs from working towards social transformation' (2006:103). Hence, the outcomes of Oluwu's (1999) *'post-colonial order'* also endanger democratic movements promoted by CSOs. Nkwi (2006) believes that in order for civil society to overcome these challenges, they must engage with what he describes as embracing *'the daily and legitimate struggles of ordinary citizens'* (2006:104). The extent to which grassroots strategies are effective in the field of inclusive education will be further explored in the empirical chapters.

4.4 Economy

Whilst measures for inclusive education can eventually provide sustained GDP growth, initial action towards such measures requires significant investment from the government. This concern was frequently raised throughout the fieldwork and will be discussed in greater depth. Prior to any further discussion regarding this debate, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the Cameroon's recent economic history.

Cameroon has succumbed to current global economic trends and is similar to most African countries whose economic and political debates are *'hinged on the neoliberal paradigm'* (Fonchingon, 2004:35). Following the economic crisis of the 1980s, Cameroon was forced to agree to a World Bank loan and neoliberal economic policies. As a result, Nsom (2011) argues that this had led to poor management of resources and economic growth that is unable to match the growing demands of the population. Consequently, neoliberal policies executed by the governing elite has also led to a depletion in human resources as the government has failed to provide a *'lack of incentives for people to stay'* (Nsom, 2011:3) this has resulted in 4 million

degree holders finding work outside the country.

As a result of such policies, economic growth has failed to meet population growth in recent years. This has led to growing dependence on importing products from abroad despite that Cameroon is rich in range of natural resources. Nsom (2011) contends that GDP growth over recent years average to approximately 3% whilst population growth is 3%. Nsom's (2011) findings show that GDP growth should approximately be 7% in order to adequately meet the needs of Cameroon's growing population.

4.5 Disability in Cameroon

Despite that 2 million of Cameroon's total population have been identified as living with a disability (WHO, 2015) the state of Cameroon has done little to integrate or support this significantly large marginalised group. UNICEF estimates that 23% of those aged 2-9 at least have one disability and *'65% of children acquired their disabilities through illnesses, such as polio, malaria, leprosy or measles'* (The Guardian, 2015). The statistics highlight that a significant part of Cameroon's society are living with a disability and a high proportion are mostly children. Thus, there is a need for the state to develop better services and opportunities for children with disabilities.

Issues pertaining to disability in Cameroon are handled by the central administration through the Ministry of Social Affairs (MINAS) and during the time of the period studied there has been no official state budget dedicated exclusively to inclusive education. MINAS defines those living with disability in accordance to the 2010 law and thus disability is identified as a *'a limitation of the opportunities of a person with impairment to full(ly) take part in an activity in a given environment'* (MINAS, 2016). In 2016, MINAS established that their responsibility concerns *'the protection of persons living with disabilities'* (2016). The following bullet points are a summary of MINAS's responsibility to those living with disabilities in Cameroon:

- Payment of tuition fees for all learners with disabilities in government secondary and higher education facilities

- Drafting the National Policy Paper on the Protection and Promotion of persons with disabilities;
- Strengthening of the legal and institutional framework for the protection and promotion of persons with disabilities. (MINAS, 2016)

4.6 Conclusions

This chapter provided an overview of significant elements of Cameroon's political history and social structures in order to situate SEEPD and its work for CWDs. The context highlighted how colonialism created the political and societal structures in which Cameroon currently operates.

Firstly, the work of the Baptists in Cameroon was a legacy of colonialism and their efforts have gone beyond the initial civilising mission as they are now firmly rooted in Cameroon society with a strong base in the Northwest.

Secondly, the period of French and British colonisation has resulted in an unstable political system that is superficially democratic. Scholars have noted that the period of colonisation has resulted in two distinct Cameroons which have prevented Cameroon to unify as one nation. The tensions between Anglophones and Francophones has not been fully resolved and any structural changes towards democratic measures are a result of Anglophone challenges to the centralised system which is dominated by President Biya's ruling party.

Finally, the section on disability illustrates that Cameroon has no major policies or objectives relating to the education of CWDs or inclusive education. Furthermore, this section demonstrated that there is a discrepancy in relation to which Ministry is responsible for this specific concern as MINAS is designated to handle matters concerning disability but not education.

Overall, the context chapter presents a country which may not have the necessary structures and resources required to successfully implement inclusive education. The following chapters will address how SEEPD operated and achieved outcomes within this context.

Chapter 5: The Programme for the Socio Economic Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (SEEPD)

This chapter provides a brief overview of the Cameroon Baptist Convention (CBC), its Health Services (CBC-HS) and the program for the Socio and Economic Empowerment for Persons with Disabilities (SEEPD). The chapter's main focus concerns an analysis of how SEEPD's lobby and advocacy strategies for inclusive education resulted in certain outcomes which answers the first two sub-questions outlined in Chapter 2. It does so by constructing a timeline of SEEPD's main lobby and advocacy activities and outcomes following its three Phases from 2009 to 2016. As such, the chapter adopts a chronological perspective and the outline is as follows:

- 5.1) Cameroon Baptist Convention (CBC)
- 5.2) Phase 1 (2009-11)
- 5.3) Phase 2 (2012-2014)
- 5.4) Phase 3 (2015-2018)
- 5.5) Conclusion

5.1 Cameroon Baptist Convention

Based in Bamenda, the Cameroon Baptist Convention (CBC) began in 1954 taking over from the missionary work of the American Baptist mission. The Convention's presence is felt throughout all of Cameroon's regions and currently *'comprises (of) 28 Administrative Units, 3 Missionary Areas and 1028 organised churches with a membership of about 105,000 registered Christians'* (CBC, 2011). CBC's work is sub-divided into five components: Evangelism and Missions, Christian Education, Education, Finance and Development and Health. This chapter focuses on the health-component which is responsible for the SEEPD-Programme.

5.2.1 Cameroon Baptist Convention-Health Services

Established in 1936, the mission statement of the Cameroon Baptist Convention-Health Services (CBC-HS) asserts that *'quality care should be provided to all'* (I16)⁴. Their services aim to resolve *'both clinical and public health problems affecting individuals and communities in Cameroon and beyond.'* (CBC-HS, 2011). The organisation operates in both Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon in 6 out of 10 regions but their stronghold is the Northwest region. CBC-HS comprises of 7 hospitals, 28 health centres, 50 primary health centres and a pharmaceutical procurement and distribution service (CBC-HS, 2011). CBC-HS has approximately 17 funding partners which include the Cameroon Ministry of Public Health, various INGOs, academic institutions and local development actors.

Prior to the inception of the programme for the Socio Economic Empowerment for Persons with Disabilities (SEEPD) in 2009, CBC-HS were known for their expertise in providing services for leprosy, optometry, physiotherapy, orthopaedics, community based rehabilitation and education for learners with visual and hearing impairments. However, there was no *'firm advocacy platform'* (CBC-HS, 2015) dedicated to improving the quality of life of those living with disabilities.

Consequently, one of CBC-HS's donors, the Christian Blind Mission (CBM) collaborated with SEEPD to create a new programme based on the ideals promoted by CBM's "Vision 2010." Both organisations decided they wanted to design a programme that would focus on improving the *'quality of life'* of PWDs (I58). After inviting the Dutch organisation MDF to consult on the current working strategy within Cameroon, it was decided by both CBC-HS and CBM to create SEEPD, a programme that, amongst a range of activities also conducts lobby and advocacy activities with the aim of improving the overall quality of life of PWDs.

5.2.2 Socio Economic Empowerment for Persons with Disabilities (SEEPD)

CBC-HS's programme for the Socio Economic Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (SEEPD) began in 2009 with an aim to provide holistic services to empower the lives of PWDs and mainstream disability among communities in

⁴ Appendix 1. shows detailed list of participants

Northwest Cameroon. CBM and Australian Aid are the programme's main funders.

Figure 8. provides a basic overview of the program⁵:

Senior Staff/Management	4 (2016)
Programme Officers	6 (2016)
Major Funders	Christoffel Blinden Mission (CBM) Australian Aid Dordrecht-Bamenda Foundation Canadian Working Group on HIV and Rehabilitation (CWGHR) International Centre for Disability and Rehabilitation (ICDR) Liliane Foundation, The Netherlands HEARTS for the DEAF, USA
No. of implementing partners	17
Phase 1: 2009-2011	Objective: Empower PWDs
	Components: Education, Medical and Rehabilitation, Empowerment and Communication
Phase 2: 2012-2015	Objective: Mainstreaming Disabilities (placing empowered PWDs in inclusive settings)
	Components: Health, Education, Livelihood and Social Participation
Phase 3: 2016-2018	Objective: Mainstreaming Local Development Actors
	Components: Education, Medical and Rehabilitation, Empowerment and Communication, Gender and Child Protection

Figure 9. SEEPD Basic Information

(Source: SEEPD, 2015)

The central ethos of SEEPD is 'to contribute to general community development by reducing the relation between poverty and disability' (SEEPD, 2015). SEEPD followed a twin-track approach of mainstreaming disability and empowering PWDs in the Anglophone Northwest Region of Cameroon. SEEPD was designed as an integrated programme with four key components: (1) Education, (2) Medical and Rehabilitation,

⁵ Data collected did not reveal the SEEPD's budget

(3) Empowerment and (4) Communication. This study focuses on the education component which adopts an explicit lobby and advocacy strategy.

The over-arching aim of the education component was to empower CWDs in the Northwest by ensuring they have equal and fair access to education in government schools. SEEPD observed that there were *'few children with mild impairments in mainstream schools'* (2015) and barely any people were aware of the need to provide suitable education services for CWDs. Prior to 2009, special schools were the only options for CWDs to learn within an environment which catered to their needs and *'not all forms of disabilities warrant special learning environments'* (SEEPD, 2010). Moreover, not all families could afford to send their children to such schools which are not supported by the state. Consequently, the education component focused on overcoming two challenges related to CWDs:

- Increase the number of CWDs attending school
- Ensure that inclusive education becomes *'sectoral (government) policy' (158)*.

The remainder of this chapter will provide a descriptive narrative of the strategies employed to overcome these challenges and subsequent outcomes of the education component for all three phases.

5.3 Phase 1 (2009-11)

Taking into consideration the aforementioned challenges, the education component focused on overcoming two challenges related to CWDs during Phase 1. The first included making CWDs, their carers and the wider community in the Northwest aware that it is the right of CWDs to receive an education and this education is economically beneficial to their families and the entire community which would subsequently create a demand for inclusive education. The second objective was to fulfil this demand by creating equal and fair schooling and examination opportunities for CWDs. This section presents the challenges identified by SEEPD in Phase 1 and how they employed certain strategies in order to resolve these problems. The following table summarises the main problems that SEEPD identified, the activities undertaken to address these issues and the power-holders that were targeted

during Phase 1:

Problem	Activities	Power-holder	2009	2010	2011
Few CWDs attend school	Media campaigns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No power-holder (indirect advocacy strategy) 			
	Community mobilization				
	Role models-Showcasing examples of empowered PWDs in public spaces				
Government schools do not practice inclusive education	Consultative Workshops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional Delegates Local Education Authorities 			
	Construction of “example” ramps in pilot schools to motivate local development actors to copy SEEPD’s example.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Parent Teacher Associations Councils 			
	Teacher workshops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional Delegates Local Education Authorities Teachers 			
	Development of Teacher Handbook				
	Monitoring exercises conducted in order to improve implementation of inclusive education				
GCE Board does not conduct examinations inclusively	Direct meetings with GCE Board	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GCE Board Registrar 			
	Collaborating with SAJOCAH				

Figure 10. Overview of Problems, Activities and power-holders in Phase 1

(Source: Analysis based on data collected during fieldwork period)

The resolutions to the three different problems addressed in Figure 10 are discussed further below.

5.2.1 Creating Awareness for Inclusive Education

In 2009, SEEPD identified that few CWDs were attending school in the Northwest region and prior to any lobby and advocacy work that focused on policy and practice, SEEPD would have to begin by ‘preparing the ground’ (15) for inclusive education.

SEEPD strategized that sensitisation would lead to the public '*favouring inclusion in mainstream schools*' (SEEPD, 2015) and '*generate a demand*' (I16 and I6) for inclusive education. This was a pre-emptive strategy as SEEPD expected that such a demand would subsequently pressure power-holders to practice inclusive education and change policy. SEEPD worked closely with the communications section and CBC-HS's Community Based Rehabilitation Team in order to achieve these aims.

A former member of the SEEPD-team noted that there was previously '*no awareness creation and some people are thinking "well as far as disability is concerned it happens to someone else"*' (I28). Through media productions such as radio shows, documentaries, posters, brochures, webpages and newsletters SEEPD sensitised CWDs, their carers and the general public about the long-term economic benefits of educating CWDs and how it is every Cameroonian's right to be educated (I28).

Through field notes, this study observed that the communications component's most valuable contribution was their radio segment entitled "You and the News" which was still ongoing at the time of research (March 2016). This segment aimed to empower CWDs by ensuring that they (and their carers) became aware of their rights according to Cameroonian law. Most importantly, this segment uses caller feedback and role-models in order to illustrate that '*disability does not mean inability*' and we are all at risk of becoming disabled (I1 and FDG 2). A focus groups with community leaders (FDG3) showed that communities in the Northwest are aware that CWDs have the potential to participate economically and socially but this can only be achieved through including CWDs in schools. Beneficiaries also noted that this message boosted their self-esteem (FDG 2).

Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR) is a unit within CBC-HS that strengthens community structures through providing one-on-one support with field workers who act as a link between communities in the Northwest and CBC-HS. Their role in Phase 1 focused on helping to create a demand for inclusive education. This was mainly done through '*advocacy with the use of role models*' (I18), targeting religious institutions and providing annual holiday workshops for children with and without impairments (I18). Through the networks already established by CBR, SEEPD

utilised religious platforms such as churches and mosques to spread their message to the general public. CBR's staff explained that these activities helped to *'build self-esteem by bringing them (CWDs and children) together'* (I18).

Overall, this study found that the work with the CBR and the communications department acted as a pre-emptive strategy that helped to prepare the general public for future policy change and encourage CWDs to attend school. Although this study only used qualitative methods of data collection, there were several indicators to suggest that these strategies helped to change wider perceptions regarding disability. Firstly, SEEPD's communication department noted that throughout Phase 1 the number of callers per show averaged to approximately 30-35 (I28). Secondly, discussions with local Pastors (I31 and I51) and Imams (I52) showed that SEEPD's work has helped to sensitise their respective worshippers about the need to educate CWDs within their communities but more work needs to be done to reach out to people in rural areas who have restricted access to televisions and radios (I31 and I51). Thirdly, the remainder of the study demonstrates that various beneficiaries, stakeholders and power-holders in the Northwest were receptive to the practice inclusive education in government schools as SEEPD estimated by the end of Phase 2 they had *sensitised '148,785 people on the importance of education for CWDs'* (SEEPD, 2015).

However, there was no concrete evidence to suggest that this early sensitisation of the general public pressured power-holders to change their behaviour as suggested in the conceptual scheme presented in Chapter 2 (Figure 2). Most power-holders interviewed for this study stated that they were already aware that few CWDs could attend schools as they experienced their own *'personal challenges'* (I11) with trying to integrate CWDs whilst working as teachers in government schools⁶ (I11, I33 and I37). Nevertheless, SEEPD sensitised them about the solution to this problem in the form of inclusive education which will be addressed in the following section (I11, I33 and I37).

⁶ Most education authorities in Cameroon are required to have teaching experience (I33)

5.2.2 Pilot Schools

Once SEEPD had started to generate a demand for inclusive education, they needed to ensure that the government could mainstream disability in their schools through practicing inclusive education. Inclusive education requires government schools to be equipped with suitable technology, trained/sensitised teachers and universal building access (e.g. ramps). In essence, they must create an environment in which CWDs can learn alongside other students in government schools.

SEEPD pursued this ideal through a bottom-up approach, focusing on practice of inclusive education in government schools and changing policy later. However, in order to practice inclusion, SEEPD acknowledged the arena in which they should conduct their tactics would be the school milieu which included the Local Education Authorities (LEA) who could facilitate access to schools and teachers where they could implement inclusive education. The LEA are auxiliaries of Cameroon's Ministry of National Education (MoE) who are based within the regions. The LEA is headed by Regional Delegates for basic (primary) and secondary education who explained that *'you need particular authorisation to get into the school'* (I33). Regional Delegates are supported by various civil servants which include Divisional Delegates, Pedagogic Inspectors, Principals (for secondary education) and Head-teachers (for primary education). Regional Delegates can change and implement policies within the region as long as it does not interfere with national law or require additional resources. Hence, SEEPD could not bypass these authorities if they wished to mainstream disability in government schools and provide CWDs with fair and equal education opportunities.

Consequently, SEEPD facilitated three consultative workshops with the LEA regarding the need to implement inclusive education within the Northwest. In order to ensure the LEA attended the workshop, SEEPD hand-delivered invitations to participants. This approach appeared to be a success as 30 out of 31 invitees attended the initial workshop consultative workshop in 2009 (I5). In addition, SEEPD recruited a former teacher who is now SEEPD's Education Advisor to facilitate these workshops. A few participants (I5 and I28) have suggested that her husband's former position as a Regional Delegate also helped to convince the LEA to attend the

workshop but others argued that it did not make a difference as SEEPD's connection to CBC-HS was enough to attract the LEA (I7).

The content delivered within these workshops aimed to help education stakeholders understand the need to practice inclusive education in the schools that they managed. SEEPD documentation (2015) states that facilitators reminded the LEA that Cameroon was a signatory of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) and the state has signed legislation that favour the *'promotion and protection on the rights of persons with disabilities'* (SEEPD, 2015). Consequently, SEEPD achieved what Kolb (2007) would categorise as an agenda outcome as one Regional Delegate explained that *'government (now) wants to play a prominent role in the education of such children* (I33).

In 2010, following the consultative workshops and direct meetings, SEEPD successfully sold the concept of piloting inclusive education in government schools to the Regional Delegates in the Northwest. In order to convince the Regional Delegates to authorise a pilot scheme for inclusive education, SEEPD utilised both a rights-based and economic argument. This has been summarised by a SEEPD Programme Officer who explained that *'there is no law to not accept CWDs and it's a blank cheque (from SEEPD)'* (I3). The first point accurately states that there is no law preventing government schools from accepting CWDs and as Cameroon has signed the UN CRPD. In addition, SEEPD promised to provide free resources and training required to mainstream disability in the government schools. Hence, there was no reason why the Regional Delegates would refuse such a beneficial offer.

As a result of their consultative workshops and direct meetings with the Regional Delegates, SEEPD were authorised to practice or implement inclusive education in government schools within the Northwest. However, it should be noted that the Regional Delegates did not create a new policy for the pilot scheme but provided SEEPD with access to government schools and this could be interpreted as a precursor to policy or an alternative outcome. The Regional Delegates authorised one primary and one secondary school in each division of the Northwest. However, an additional three schools were added but the scheme is officially referred to as the

“14 Pilot Schools”⁷ (SEEPD, 2015). The purpose of creating the pilot schools was to increase the number of CWDs attending schools and prove to the Ministry of National Education (MoE) that practicing inclusive education in government schools is feasible.

In 2010, SEEPD began mainstreaming disability in the pilot schools by employing two main tactics. These included modifying physical access and providing sensitisation workshops to teachers. The programme strategized that their actions would act as model *‘for the schools to follow in subsequent construction work’* (SEEPD, 2015) This appeared to be an effective strategy as in 2015 three Councils independently changed their policies (policy outcome) for all new state buildings to provide universal access. From 2010 onwards, SEEPD initiated workshops for teachers. SEEPD and the Regional Delegates agreed that SEEPD’s Education Advisor (a teacher) would help to coordinate the activities of SEEPD, the pilot schools and LEA. The Education Advisor conducted one-day workshops with teachers and distributed a handbook which provided *‘basic strategies for inclusion’* (SEEPD, 2015). These workshops were followed by an intensive two-week workshop on inclusive education that was conducted in the summer of 2011.

As a result of their efforts, the first student with a severe visual impairment was able to study in the pilot school by the end of Phase 1. This was considered to be an impressive outcome as it highlighted that government had the potential to accept more learners with visual impairments.

5.2.3 Inclusive Examination Conditions

Alongside their work within the Northwest, SEEPD engaged with the national examination board for Anglophone students, the GCE Board. The GCE Board became an important arena as this institution is responsible for providing learners with qualifications that are necessary for either finding employment or entering higher education institutions within Cameroon. SEEPD noted that the examination rules were not conducive to CWDs and they prevented learners with disabilities from performing to their full potential. In 2010, SEEPD and a Regional Delegate met with

⁷ Figure 3. shows the geographical locations of the pilot schools.

the administration of the GCE Board.

During this meeting, SEEPD explained how examination conditions were not fair for students with visual and hearing impairments and manual dexterity challenges. Firstly, learners with visual impairments had to wait for their scripts to be brailled manually. This resulted in candidates with visual impairments enforced to complete their examination in a special centre away from other candidates and they would typically end the exam in the late evening whilst other candidates finished earlier. Secondly, examinations included questions that CWDs could not answer due to their disability and this would limit the number of questions available. Finally, the GCE Board did not recognise that CWDs require extra time depending on their disability. SEEPD presented a series of solutions to these issues which are as follows:

- Instead of exempting CWDs from questions, the GCE Board could substitute such questions with those that test the required knowledge in a relevant format.
- Additional time was necessary for candidates who are blind, deaf or have manual dexterity challenges.
- The GCE Board should braille examinations prior to the exam day so all candidates commence writing exams at the same time (SEEPD, 2015).

Whilst the GCE Board understood the need to support CWDs (agenda outcome), SEEPD's demands concerning brailing did not align with the board. The GCE Board feared that '*one person transcribing both ways*' (I43) could compromise the integrity of the examinations as examination scripts could not leave the GCE Board's premise prior to the examination day. In order to remedy this, SEEPD loaned machinery and brailled examinations at the GCE Board's headquarters. This ensured that examinations scripts could be brailled before the examination day and the integrity of the examination would not be compromised.

Consequently, in June 2011 SEEPD helped to GCE Board braille scripts for the 2012 examinations. Kolb would identify this as a collective outcome as there was no official policy or pre-emptive agreement (alternative) to implement at the end of

Phase 1 but candidates with visual impairments could start examinations at the same time as other students.

5.3 Phase 2 (2012-14)

Whilst Phase 1 focused on empowerment of PWDs, SEEPD's overall aim of Phase 2 was to ensure that empowered PWDs have the capacity to reach their full potential in "inclusive settings" such as pilot schools. The education component had already started to achieve this through the creation of their pilot school scheme in Phase 1. Consequently, this phase saw the education component conducting activities that would strengthen the pilot schools and improve their relationship with the GCE Board. The remainder of this section explains the challenges the education component identified in Phase 2, their related strategies and any outcomes achieved during this period. Figure 11. summarises the problem analysis and strategies utilised by SEEPD during phase 2:

Problem	Activities	Power-holder	2012	2013	2014
GCE Board has no policy for CWDs in the Northwest	Direct Meetings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GCE Board Registrar 			
	Donation of embosser for brailing examinations				
IE not fully implemented/practiced in pilot schools	Teacher workshops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional Delegates LEA Teachers 			
	Monitoring and Evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional Delegates LEA Teachers 			
	Direct Meetings and Presentations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PTA Bamenda 2 Council 			

Figure 11. Overview of Problems, Activities and Power-Holders in Phase 2

(Source: Analysis based on data collected during fieldwork period)

5.3.2 Implementation of Inclusive Education in Pilot Schools

In Phase 1, SEEPD worked towards creating a demand for inclusive education and persuading the Regional Delegates to create pilot schools. However, the actual implementation of inclusive education had not yet been fully achieved in 2012. Implementation was partially achieved through providing refresher courses for all teachers of the pilot schools. One participant explained how the authority of the Regional Delegates was used to again to enforce teachers from the pilot schools to participate in SEEPD's workshops:

We could organise an event and ask the Regional Delegate (...) and once it comes from this authority everybody is obliged to attend (128).

By the end of Phase 2, SEEPD claimed that 478 teachers had attended their training session on basic inclusive education strategies including Sign Language and Braille (SEEPD, 2015). In 2012, SEEPD also appointed and trained one teacher per pilot school to act as a Lead Person within the pilot schools. The Lead Person helps to organise seminars for teachers and provide support to teachers in matters regarding inclusive education.

In addition, SEEPD constructed one resource centre for GBHS Bamenda which helped significantly to support the quality of education offered to CWDs. As mentioned earlier, Regional Delegates could not provide additional resources to the pilot schools. Consequently, SEEPD raised funds from the Netherlands (Bamenda-Dordrecht Foundation) in order to implement a resource centre in GBHS Bamenda. Basic technology such as recorders and computers helped students with visual and hearing impairments to follow classes with little assistance from teachers. SEEPD intended for the Lead Person to maintain and coordinate activities for the resource

centre⁸, once the necessary funding had been allocated to create such a centre. However, SEEPD realised that they could not fund-raise for resource centres to be implemented in every pilot school and several participants noted that resource centres or supportive devices are '*crucial*' (I7) for the implementation of inclusive education in the pilot schools. Hence, the inability to provide material resources hindered implementation of the pilot schools.

Furthermore, this study found that implementation or practice of inclusive education has not been fully realised following a comparison between the best and worst pilot schools.⁹ GBHS Bamenda was identified as the best school and GBHS Mbengwi as the least successful pilot school. GBHS Bamenda currently taught approximately 30 CWDs out of 5,000 students (I19). Additionally, focus group discussions conducted with CWDs at GBHS Bamenda suggested that students with impairments were able to perform to their full potential due to the inclusive measures provided by SEEPD and the school. SEEPD believed that this success can be attributed to the construction of a resource centre as CWDs '*need supportive devices*' (I18). In addition, SEEPD's education advisor worked at this school and helped to maintain inclusive education practices on a daily basis (I19 and I7).

Nonetheless, teachers in both schools revealed they felt that inclusive education was not practiced sufficiently. This can be further evidenced by the H-Diagram in Figure 12. which demonstrates how the majority of teachers in GBHS Mbengwi perceived the implementation of inclusive education to be less than satisfactory. The reasons of which are related to the POS and will be further discussed in Chapter 6.

⁸ A resource centre contains necessary technologies and equipment required to teach CWDs

⁹ This was deliberated with SEEPD staff through semi-structured interviews and FDGs




Figure 12. H-Diagram from GBHS Mbengwi

(Source: HD3)

Overall, these achievements fit into what Kolb would describe as a collective outcome as CWDs within the Northwest now have the opportunity to attend a government school although the actual implementation of inclusive education requires improvement.

5.3.3 Donation of Embosser and Achievements with the GCE Board

Towards the end of Phase 1, SEEPD sensitised the GCE Board and persuaded them to allow SEEPD to braille their examination scripts. In order to encourage the GCE Board to braille examinations independently at their headquarters, SEEPD donated an embosser to the Board and trained staff in brailing. Following the donation of the embosser, SEEPD achieved several outcomes relating to the GCE Board.

From 2012, SEEPD sustained their collective outcome achieved in Phase 1. SEEPD initially loaned machinery to the GCE Board to help produce brailled copies of examination scripts and this was made permanent once SEEPD donated an embosser

to the Board in order to ensure that all candidates start writing at the same time. In addition, SEEPD achieved what Kolb (2007) would describe as policy and procedural outcomes. Figure 13. demonstrates that students with visual impairments are entitled to a braille script (which is brailled before the examination) and they are provided with 25% additional time (along with students with learning disabilities). Figure 13. also shows that CWDs have been officially recognised by the GCE Board (procedural outcomes).




Figure 13. Examination Policies benefitting CWDs

(Source: General Regulations on GCE Board examinations, 2016:40-41)

As a way to consolidate this partnership, SEEPD signed a MoU with the GCE Board in 2013 which was renewed in 2014. It was not possible to access the MoU due to confidentiality clauses, however interviewees and newspaper articles noted that in essence this document was an agreement that the two organisations would continue working together *'to facilitate the effective writing of the GCE by students with visual impairments in Cameroon'* (The Median Paper, 2014).

However, it should be noted that the comparative study showed that the implementation of the policy for additional time was partially successful. Whilst CWDs from GBHS Bamenda were provided with additional time, CWDs and their carers from GBHS Mbengwi were not aware that they were entitled to these special conditions and consequently failed their examinations (I49 and I50).

5.4 Phase 3 (2015-18)

SEEPD and the education component shared the same objective for Phase 3 which was to improve the capacity of local development actors as a means of sustaining the projects SEEPD initiated in the previous phases and *'encouraging government to take over'* (I5). The issue concerning the construction of resource centres in Phase 2 illustrated that it would be impossible for SEEPD to implement inclusive education in the Northwest without greater financial and legislative support from the state. Consequently, Phase 3 introduced an additional arena which was the local government actors or to be more precise municipal Councils. Additionally, the education component made greater attempts to sensitise the Ministry of Education (MoE). This section focuses on the new power-holders that SEEPD engaged with and provides an overview of the strategies and outcomes related to them. Figure 14. summarises the challenges and strategies employed by SEEPD in Phase 3:

Problem	Power-Holder	Activities	2015	2016

Only 4/34 Councils support SEEPD	Councils in the Northwest	Direct Meetings		
		Workshops		
Ministry of National Education is not sensitised and does not provide resources	Ministry of National Education (Secondary and Basic)	Sending Reports via the Regional Delegates (began in Phase 2)		
		Meeting with allies e.g. INGOs and Prime Minister		

Figure 14. Overview of Problems, Activities and Power-Holders in Phase 3

(Sources: Analysis based on data collected during fieldwork period)

5.4.1 Inclusion of Local Councils

SEEPD decided to follow the advice of their research partner the Centre for Inclusive Studies (CIS) and place greater emphasis on lobbying Councils. CIS argued that with decentralisation the Councils are gradually gaining more legislative and financial power (129). SEEPD considered Councils to be an important structure to sensitise as they are *'an integrated part of our (Cameroonian) schools system'* (158). CIS also emphasised the importance of targeting councils as they can influence the wider public and other subsidiary power-holders such as PTAs, Principals, Parliamentarians and traditional authorities to support inclusive education within the Northwest.

In 2015, before directly targeting Councils, SEEPD already achieved what Kolb (2007) describes as a policy outcome. Councils authorities who participated in a training workshop explained that they were inspired by the model of the pilot schools to help CWDs (field notes). As a result, in 2015 SEEPD documented that two Councils had established policies *'that (financially) support the (basic) education¹⁰ of CWDs'* (SEEPD, 2015 and Figure 15.) and three Councils created universal building

¹⁰ MINAS only subsidises school fees for CWDs attending government secondary or higher education institutions

policies¹¹ ‘ordering all (state) buildings to be accessible’ (17 and Figure 15.). Outcomes with Councils improved significantly by the start of 2016 as 18 out of the 34 Councils had agreed to mainstream inclusive education in their agendas and budgets (13). Figures 15 and 16 demonstrate how SEEPD’s partnership with Councils rapidly increased between 2015 and 2016.




Figure 15. Councils (located by divisions not sub-divisions) in the Northwest Supporting CWDs through Policy

(Source: SEEPD, 2015)

¹¹ See Appendix 7.1 for Council Policy on Universal Building Access




Figure 16. Councils in the Northwest Supporting CWDs through MoUs and Action Plans

(Source: SEEPD, 2016)

The fairly recent collaboration between the 18 Councils and the SEEPD Program was predominantly achieved through the CBR Team and the community component of SEEPD. One Programme Officer summarised that when it came to lobbying Councils, SEEPD's strategy was to meet with Mayors and explain that the implementation of inclusive education is their job and SEEPD can support them with this task. The following extract summarises the direct tactics used when convincing Councils to sign Memorandums of Understanding with SEEPD:

So we are not bringing something new to the Council, we are just telling them that, okay this is what it means. We can work with you to improve on the conditions of PWDs/CWDs in the things that you are doing (13).

Members of the SEEPD-team explained that due to SEEPD's association with the highly reputable CBC-HS and its CBR-Team, it has been fairly easy to access Council through direct meetings with the Mayors across the Northwest. During these meetings SEEPD introduces themselves as an affiliate of CBC-HS, they explain the

importance of supporting CWDs in the community and how the UN's sustainable development goals will not be achieved if government fails to provide equal and fair education opportunities to CWDs (I13).

Depending on their receptivity, SEEPD would then invite the Mayor of the Council to sign an Memorandum of Understanding and Action Plans¹². These documents are an agreement or '*protocol of collaboration*' which is based on research that '*revealed the prevalence of disability caused by motorbikes*' (I13). The MoUs and Action Plans outline the responsibilities that both parties must adhere to in order to prevent the prevalence of disabilities and provide fair and equal opportunities for PWDs. This agreement is essentially a precursor to future policy changes and can be categorised as an alternative outcome.

The agreement between Councils and SEEPD also includes the appointment of a Focal Person. The objective of the Focal Person is to act as an intermediary between SEEPD and the Council in order to ensure that Action Plans are successfully implemented by Councils. This specific result is notable in that it fits into Kolb's categorisation as an institutional outcome as there is representative of CWDs (Focal Person) involved with the state's formal decision making process.

In late 2015, SEEPD started to follow their end of the bargain by conducting workshops for Councils. The first workshop aimed to improve the capacity of Mayors and provide a platform for Mayors across the Northwest to openly discuss the challenges of Inclusive education. In early 2016, SEEPD provided a second training workshop to 15 Focal Persons. The second workshop aimed to build the capacity of Focal Persons and teach them ways in which they can mainstream disability into Council policy.

Within the MoU, Councils also agreed to follow Action Plans that stipulate that Councils must collaborate with SEEPD on specific projects for CWDs. In order to ensure these Action Plans are being followed, SEEPD utilises their media partners to follow-up on promises the Councils have made. Journalists attend Council sessions where they are able to expose politicians who have not followed through on

¹² For an example of MoU and Action Plan see Appendix 7.

previous promises. One journalist explained how this tactic can lead to policy changes:

We do follow up. Because during council sessions I can go as a journalist but also as a monitoring for SEEPD to find out what they are doing in the councils (I35).

5.4.3 The Ministry of National Education

In 2015, SEEPD started to make greater efforts to target the Basic and Secondary institutions of the Ministry National of Education (MoE). When implementing inclusive education in the pilot schools during the previous phase, SEEPD had exhausted power-holders available within the Anglophone regions. Consequently, SEEPD recognised the material limitations of these power-holder and sought to focus their attention to the centralised MoE. The MoE is the most powerful actor in Cameroon¹³ when it comes to realizing inclusive education due to its control over the budget for national education and its power to propose and implement education laws (I53, PM1, PM2 and PM3). In order to achieve sustainability, SEEPD believed that they could now use the pilot schools as an example to demonstrate to the MoE that inclusive education is feasible.

Due to the centralised nature of the Cameroonian government (which will be discussed further in Chapter 6), SEEPD found it difficult to directly communicate these ideas with key legislators. SEEPD explained that they already attempted to contact ministers during Phase 1 through *'requesting meeting, letters, (and) calling'* (I28). In addition, SEEPD tried to communicate to the MoE through ensuring that the pilot schools were included in reports produced by the LEA and Regional Delegates that are sent to the MoE in Yaoundé (I33 and I4). One Programme Officer noted that his main responsibility included monitoring the pilot schools and publishing reports which are passed through the Regional Delegates of education (I13 and I4). However, these attempts to contact the MoE seemed to have reaped no direct outcomes.

¹³ See Appendix 4. for Power-Maps

The conceptual scheme highlights that CSOS/SMOs can also influence power-holders via allies and this is how SEEPD accessed this particular power-holder. In 2015, SEEPD was granted an audience by the Prime-Minister in Yaoundé (which will be discussed further in Chapter 6). As a result of this meeting the Prime-Minister promised publicly to *'make arrangements to meet the ministers (of National Education) and channel their (SEEPD's) challenges and recommendations to them'* (CameroonWeb, 2015).

By the end of 2015, SEEPD eventually met the Minister of Basic Education from the MoE who is the highest ranking official for matters concerning basic education in Cameroon. His immediate subordinate, the Secretary-General from the MoE also attended this meeting and summarised the extent to which this meeting influenced their thoughts in regards to inclusive education:

I thought that at that moment that was something to learn from, the government would learn from this private initiative and us as inspectors from (the Ministry of) basic education to work in Northwest and study this program and see what was on the ground (...) but I'm not sure that some concerted evaluation was made of what was actually going on on the ground in the Northwest (154).

This quotation suggests that following the meeting with the Minister of Basic Education, SEEPD had achieved the agenda outcome with the Minister of Basic Education and his close subordinates who attended the meeting. However, the *'concerted evaluation'* (154) was not conducted by the Ministry of Basic Education. Consequently, this study found that SEEPD either contributed or re-enforced sensitisation of the MoE as the INGO Sight Savers had already successfully lobbied the Ministry of Basic Education on inclusive education. In 2015, Sight Savers announced that they are collaborating with the Ministry of Basic Education on a national pilot scheme for inclusive education in 68 government primary schools (115). However, the Minister of Basic Education nor the Secretary-General have not furthered their relationship with SEEPD beyond this meeting.

5.5 Conclusions

This chapter examined the lobby & advocacy strategy employed by SEEPD to realise inclusive education for CWDs and the related outcomes achieved. Phase 1 of SEEPD started with a bottom-up approach and focused firstly on sensitisation of the general public in the Northwest region particularly CWDs and their carers. The underlying logic was that this would generate a demand for inclusive education which could pressure power-holders to change or create policies favouring inclusion. In addition, SEEPD used consultative workshops and direct meetings to convince the Regional Delegates to provide SEEPD with access to schools. In addition, SEEPD met with the GCE Board in order to lobby for inclusive examination policies and practice for CWDs.

During Phase 1 SEEPD achieved several outcomes in relation to the empowerment of CWDs. These included creating a demand for inclusive education, making Regional Delegates and the GCE Board aware of the need to include CWDs in government education and the creation of the pilot schools within the Northwest. Once the pilot school was authorised, SEEPD established several activities within the schools which they hoped would ensure that inclusive education is practiced.

SEEPD's over-arching aim for Phase 2 was to mainstream disabilities in the community. The education component followed this objective by continuing to implement of inclusive education in the pilot schools. These activities included workshops to sensitise teachers in the pilot schools, special workshops to train Lead Persons in schools and creating a resource centre for GBHS Bamenda. Phase 2 also saw great breakthrough with the GCE Board following the donation of an embosser. The GCE Board started to officially recognise the needs of CWDs and created policies that favoured inclusive examination conditions. The results with the GCE Board have been one of SEEPD's greatest outcomes as they have influenced a national power-holder to change regulation which has consequently benefited CWDs across Cameroon.

Whilst SEEPD always considered how their strategies such as the pilot school scheme would impact Councils and the MoE, it was only in Phase 3 that they began to directly target these power-holders. SEEPD recognised the limitations of working

exclusively with Regional Delegates and the GCE Board. They acknowledged that directly targeting the MoE would generate greater resources to sustain the implementation of inclusive education in the pilot schools. When it came to Councils, SEEPD did not notice any obvious resistance, however, SEEPD were required to consider alternative strategies when it came to influencing the MoE. Consequently, SEEPD made swift progress sensitising Councils and persuading them to sign MoUs. Yet, outcomes with the MoE remains at the level of sensitisation and it is difficult to ascertain to what extent SEEPD were responsible for this. Figure 15. summarises all the strategies employed by SEEPD and their related outcomes:

Year	Strategy	Outcome	Year Achieved	Category
2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Consultative Workshops - Direct Meetings 	Sensitization of Regional Delegates and LEA	2009	Agenda Procedural
2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Consultative Workshops - Direct meetings 	Authorization of Pilot schools	2009	Alternative
2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Direct meetings - Informal connections 	Sensitization of GCE Board	2010/11	Agenda Procedural
2010-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Direct Meetings - Meeting Prime-Minister (allies) - Reports - Meeting Minister of Basic Education 	Partial sensitization of the central government	2015	Agenda
2010-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Direct Meetings - Donation of embosser 	MoU with GCE Board	2013/14	Alternative
2010-2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Direct meetings 	GCE changes examination policies (+25% additional time)	2011/12	Policy
2010-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Direct meetings - Brailing exams - Donation of embosser 	Brailing of Examinations	2011/12	Collective

2011-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Appointment of education advisor - Workshops for teachers - Appointment of lead person - M&E - Fundraising for resource centre 	Practice of Inclusive Education in Pilot Schools	2011-present	Collective
2012	<p>Indirect Tactics:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pilot Schools - Media - CBR 	3 Councils created a policy for universal access and 2 Councils finance CWDs basic education	2014	Policy
2015-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Direct Meetings via CBR 	Collective Sensitization of Councils	2015 onwards	Agenda
2015-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Direct Meetings via CBR 	MoU with 19/35 councils	2015-present	Alternative
2015-present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Direct meetings, media, training workshops, MoU 	Appointment of 15 Council Focal Persons	2016	Institutional

Figure 17. Overall Strategies and Outcomes for SEEPD, 2016

(Source: Analysis based on data collected during fieldwork period)

Overall, this chapter showed that SEEPD has had a number of successes in influencing power-holders located within the Anglophone regions. The data collected showed that SEEPD achieved their initial aim of increasing the number of CWDs attending schools in the Northwest region as the best pilot school which previously had 0 CWDs increased to 30. Additionally, beneficiaries explained that SEEPD's activities in the pilot schools improved their quality of life and they have the potential to achieve qualifications from the GCE Board. Yet, the challenge that SEEPD is currently facing is that of up scaling its successes. To achieve this, it has started to target national level power-holders but have not yielded outcomes. The following chapter will use the Political Opportunity Structure Theory (POS) to explain how SEEPD achieved their most significant outcomes and were unable to implement inclusive education in the pilot schools.

Chapter 6: SEEPD and The Political Opportunity Structure

The previous chapter provided a descriptive narrative of SEEPD's activities and the related outcomes. Chapter 5 also explained which power-holders were targeted as part of SEEPD's strategy to achieve outcomes for inclusive education. This chapter analyses how certain elements or mechanism of the political opportunity structure (POS) affected the relationship between SEEPD's activities and outcomes discussed in Chapter 5. The following elements of the POS were explored during the fieldwork period:

- 1. Formal Institutional Structures (closed or open):** The number of access point available for a social movement to conduct lobby and advocacy activities and whether these access points are open or closed.
- 2. Informal Elite Strategies (repression or assimilation):** Whether there is a political culture of cooperation or repression towards social movements.
- 3. Configuration of Power (alliances and divisions between governing elite/power-holders):** Whether power-holders are divided or united in their position towards a social movement.
- 4. Political Output Structure (Strong to Weak):** Whether power-holders have the financial resources and skills required to meet the demands of CSOs/SMOs.

The remainder of this chapter analyses the POS in relation to the lobby and advocacy outcomes identified in the previous chapter.

6.1 Outcome 1: Sensitisation of Power-Holders.

The previous chapter explained how the sensitisation of power-holders (an agenda outcome in Kolb's terminology) was a key outcome for SEEPD throughout all three phases. This sub-section explains how certain aspects of the POS enabled and at times constrained SEEPD to achieve this outcome.

6.1.1 Sensitisation of Anglophone Power-Holders

POS theory hypothesises that the more decentralised a political system is, the more opportunities exist at different levels to conduct lobby and advocacy activities (Xie and Van der Hejen, 2010). This case-study showed that various forms of decentralisation facilitated access to power-holders with a semi-autonomous status, namely the GCE Board, Councils and Regional Delegates.

The geographical proximity of decentralised power-holders enabled SEEPD to easily achieve sensitisation (agenda outcome). Chapter 5 explained that the MoE is a partially decentralised authority that has distributed staff (Regional Delegates and LEA) across each region within Cameroon. The external placement of Regional Delegates allowed SEEPD to gain easy access as their offices are located close to SEEPD headquarters in Bamenda. The application of the 2004 law on decentralisation led to the creation of local government institutions or Councils in 2007. The purpose of creating Councils was so that there was a government authority that was *'close to the people'* (I3). The transfer of responsibility to divisions allowed SEEPD to easily contact these power-holders without having to travel outside the Northwest region and provided SEEPD with an opportunity to persistently conduct activities such as consultative workshops and direct meetings without using vast resources.

Furthermore, geographical proximity meant that SEEPD could take advantage of CBC-HS's Baptist reputation which is strongest in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon. Additionally, Chapter 4 explained how the Anglophone regions became a Baptist stronghold. One member of the SEEPD-team noted that when approaching the Councils *'it is important to say you're from CBC-HS not the SEEPD cause they don't know what that is. If you say CBC-HS they're more open'* (I3).

Similar to the Regional Delegates, the GCE Board is a decentralised authority which operates outside of Yaoundé but reports to the Ministry of Secondary Education. The headquarters of the GCE Board are located in Buae, a city that was previously the capital for Southern Cameroon. The GCE Board Registrar explained how he was aware of the religious activities of CBC-HS and that he himself was a Baptist. The Registrar elaborated that the convention's history of coming *'into help'* (I43) persuaded him to receive the SEEPD-team for a meeting. Hence, the

geographical location of these power-holders enabled SEEPD to fully exploit CBC-HS's reputation which is particularly strong in the Anglophone regions.

Additionally, the various forms of decentralisation in Cameroon has brought greater responsibility and authority to these semi-autonomous bodies who can independently create policies within their designated area of control as long as it does not contradict the MoE or national law. Nonetheless, the central government has not provided the necessary financial support required for these power-holders to effectively serve civilians. Xie and Van der Hejen (2010) would describe this as a strong political output structure as Cameroon functions from a '*central state apparatus*' (2010:44). The authors contend that this restricts SMOs from achieving aims as it reduces the resources distributed across the country and the capacity of power-holders. However, the findings for this study revealed this to be the reverse as the lack of financial capacity made all the aforementioned Anglophone power-holders more receptive to SEEPD's message. Power-holders expressed that they understood that their future engagement with the programme could eventually lead to greater financial support.

6.1.2 Meeting the Minister of Basic Education

Chapter 5 discussed why it was important to sensitise the MoE as they have the legislative and financial resources required to implement inclusive education. Whilst decentralisation of education authorities and government institutions enabled SEEPD to sensitise some power-holders, SEEPD were not able to easily access the MoE through the institutional routes established by the state. This section aims to explain how the POS restricted SEEPD's attempts to sensitise the MoE and how they were able to meet the Minister of Basic Education through allies.

SEEPD initially strategized that the practice of inclusive education in the pilot schools would be documented by Regional Delegates and reach the MoE through quarterly reports. The Regional Delegate and his subsidiaries clarified that they mentioned the success of the pilot schools within their reports that channelled back to the MoE based in Yaoundé (I25, I33 and I38). SEEPD also '*made attempts to go to Yaoundé.*' (I28) in order to meet with the MoE but their request for a meeting was

rejected or ignored. These strategies employed during the earlier phases did not yield any outcomes and SEEPD found that the MoE could not be approached via the institutionalised structures established by the state (I28).

The conceptual scheme (Figure.2) shows that power-holders can be influenced through intermediary allies. SEEPD decided to approach the MoE through their ally the Prime-Minister. The Prime-Minister has an open-door policy and *'receives anyone who books to see him'* (I15). In addition, this power-holder *'happens to be a Baptist'* (I15) and was receptive to SEEPD's aim *'on the basis of qualities in that region (and) the leader's shared ideologies'* (I15). Chapter 5, explained that this meeting with the Prime-Minister resulted in a subsequent meeting with the Minister of Basic Education, however this did not lead to any subsequent developments for SEEPD.

This study found that the reason why the MoE was not as enthusiastic to collaborate with SEEPD was to do the lack of resources they could offer the MoE. Chapter 5 illustrated that staff at the MoE reacted positively to the idea of inclusive education and were impressed by the pilot schools. However, the Secretary-General explained that the reason why SEEPD's attempts did not result in a collaboration is because they have not shown precisely *'what advantages are they bringing'* (I54).

This study analysed the strategies used by the INGO Sight Savers who have gained several outcomes with the Ministry of Basic Education. Interviews with staff from Sight Savers and the Secretary-General reveal that this INGO came with two advantages which enabled their success: networks and financial resources. The Secretary-General explained how *'Sight Savers have that (finances), they can come in, sponsoring some studies, doing some evaluation of the situation.'* (I54). Additionally, Sight Savers attributed their success to their network arguing that a CSO *'can have good ideas, bright ideas but if you don't know the right person to go to, you are less likely to penetrate that zone.'* (I28)

Thus, the MoE appeared to function in a similar manner to the other Anglophone candidates as they preferred to collaborate with partners that had financial resources to offer. SEEPD, however, could not provide this. Moreover, SEEPD could not depend on their connection to CBC-HS as their network was not as strong with education stakeholders based in Yaoundé.

6.2 Outcome 2: Authorisation and Implementation of Pilot Schools

Chapter 5 illustrated that one of SEEPD's greatest achievements was their pilot school scheme which not only acted as a precursor for future policy changes but also benefited CWDs within the Northwest. Yet, Chapter 5 showed the difficulties of implementing inclusive education in the pilot schools following the authorisation issued by the Regional Delegates. This section explains how partial decentralisation and a strong political output structure enabled SEEPD to gain authorisation from the Regional Delegates for the pilot schools but severely limited the organisation's ability to implement inclusive education.

6.2.1 Pilot Schools for Inclusive Education

Chapter 5 and Section 6.1.1 explained how Regional Delegates are essentially auxiliaries of the MoE. The delegation of power from the centralised MoE empowered the Regional Delegates to authorise projects and create policies within their region as long as it does not contradict the orders of the MoE or national law. Consequently, SEEPD directed their sensitisation efforts towards the Regional Delegates through workshops and direct meetings as they realised that once these power-holders were '*on board*' (I13), they could gain access to schools and teachers within the Northwest through their authorisation. Hence, the structural distribution of authority to the Regional Delegates (decentralisation) enabled SEEPD to gain authority for the pilot schools.

The theoretical framework explained that a strong political output structure makes it difficult for CSOs to achieve their demands. Nevertheless, the reduced capacity of Regional Delegates and their subordinates acted as one of the factors that enabled SEEPD to gain authority for the pilot schools. This particular case-study showed that the partial process of decentralisation meant that the Regional Delegates and the LEA had limited resources and skills. The MoE had enforced the Regional Delegates to handle more responsibilities but did not provide the necessary funds or budgetary authorisation required to implement new projects.

Regional Delegates believed that working with CSOs could help improve their

capacity and increase financial resources. Chapter 5 explained how SEEPD improved the quality of education offered in schools by conducting various activities such as workshops for teachers, constructing ramps and monitoring visits. The following extract illustrates how the lack of capacity within government schools and among the LEA created an opening for SEEPD to begin practicing their desired demands:

But the other thing that worked on our favour at the time was that, if you look at the government structures, the government schools, there are minimal opportunities for capacity development (I23).

The extract illustrates that SEEPD realised that they could provide services that could develop the capacities of teachers and government workers in exchange for the Regional Delegates' cooperation and authorisation for the pilot schools.

6.2.2 Implementation of Inclusive Education in the Pilot Schools

Whilst the Regional Delegates may have been able to authorise the practice of inclusive education, they did not have the capacity to help SEEPD implement inclusive education in the designated pilot schools. SEEPD found that the limited capacity of Regional Delegates restricted their ability to successfully practice inclusive education in the recently established pilot schools. As mentioned earlier, overall legislative and financial power are reserved for centralised institutions such as the MoE ¹⁴

Consequently, the Regional Delegates incapacity to provide additional financing, training or resources appeared to greatly limit SEEPD's ability to implement inclusive education. Chapter 5 explained how this study compared a successful and less successful pilot school in order to determine how well this pilot project was implemented and why implementation was hindered. The results of this

¹⁴ The World Bank observed that Regional Delegates have limited financial and material means as the central government funds regions through a 'voucher system with fixed prices' (The World Bank, 2011).

analysis highlighted that successful implementation was limited by a lack of 'motivation (wages)' (HD2 and HD3) for teachers who practice inclusion and for appointed Lead Persons within the school system who do not receive additional payment for their increased workload. Furthermore, resource centres were described as being 'necessary' (I15) for successful implementation of inclusive education. Whilst SEEPD were able to support basic construction for universal access in the pilot schools, sensitise teachers, appoint Lead Persons and conduct regular monitoring and evaluation they could not create resource centres for every school.

Finally, the study found that the central government's decision to transfer staff trained by SEEPD negatively impacted the organisation's ability to implement inclusive education in the pilot schools. Programme Officers agreed that the reason why the pilot school in Mbengwi had significantly struggled with implementing inclusive education can be attributed to the 'transfer of teachers' (HD1). This is further explained by the following extract:

Teachers are recruited by the central government and posted to different schools in the same manner teachers are transferred. So SEEPD goes in and builds the capacity of teachers and the next academic year the teacher is transferred and that's what happened in Mbengwi (I7).

As a result, the transfer of teachers from the pilot schools by the central government can significantly deter SEEPD's practice of inclusive education in the pilot schools. Yet, it is possible that the spread of sensitised teachers could influence other government schools to begin practicing inclusive education but this is heavily dependent on the abilities of that particular teacher and whether staff in the new school would be receptive to inclusive education. Overall, partial decentralisation has resulted in the MoE retaining overall authority of teachers and this has somewhat limited SEEPD's efforts to sensitise teachers and train Lead Persons in schools.

This section demonstrated that the Regional Delegates were pleased to authorise the pilot schools as they realised a collaboration with SEEPD would improve the

reduced capacity of their sub-ordinates (LEA), teachers and the overall quality of education within the Northwest. In addition, partial decentralisation within the MoE empowered the Regional Delegates with enough authority for SEEPD to gain access to government schools and practice inclusive education. Yet, the nature of decentralisation meant that financial resources and overall authority of teachers remained with the MoE in Yaoundé. This is what the theoretical framework would identify as a strong political output structure caused by partial decentralisation. Whilst this mechanism enabled SEEPD to gain authorisation, it severely limited their ability to access the necessary monetary resources required to implement inclusive education in the pilot schools and the MoE's overriding authority meant that trained teachers were transferred to other schools.

6.3 Outcome 3: Improved Examination Conditions for CWDs

This section explains how various inter-linking mechanisms of Cameroon's political system enabled SEEPD to achieve national policy, implementation and collective outcomes with the GCE Board. In short, the GCE Board's semi-autonomous status, mandate and reduced financial resources laid the groundwork for SEEPD to convince the Board to create fair and equal examination opportunities for Anglophone candidates across Cameroon.

6.3.1 Context of the GCE Board

The GCE Board has a quasi-independent status which is rooted in Cameroon's Anglophone separatist movement during the 1990s. Chapter 4 discussed that although Cameroon is officially bilingual, Anglophone citizens believed that the linguistic difference was being used to empower the Francophone elite and marginalise the Anglophone minority. As a way to reclaim their relevance and preserve their culture, the Anglophone community went to great lengths to prevent the GCE Board from becoming undermined by the MoE who attempted to reform the GCE examination to a style similar to the Francophone model (Nyamnjoh and Fonteh Akum, 2008:366). In order to ease tensions, the MoE permitted the GCE

Board to create their own policies but they continue to be *'under the tutelage of the Minister in charge of Secondary Education'* (GCE Board, 2015).

While the GCE Board is semi-autonomous, it is limited in its ability to access funds from the state. As such, the GCE Board lacked the financial resources to pay for an embosser to braille examinations; one of SEEPD's demands. The GCE Board explained that they only receive state funds for examinations and *'nothing in particular for inclusive education'* (I43). The GCE Board could either apply for an embosser from the Ministry of Secondary Education and this request would only be accepted if the funds were available (I43).

Additionally, the GCE Board is expected to work with CSOs as they provide resources, services or funding for development projects that fit their mandate. Article 2 of the GCE Board Mandate states that the Board is encouraged to *'enter into contracts, borrow, establish trust act as trustees solely or jointly with any other persons'* and *'expected to accept gifts, legacies and donations'* (Order No. 112/CAB/PM).

6.32) Achieving Outcomes with a Trojan Horse

The semi-autonomous nature of the GCE Board meant that the Board were given a lot of responsibility but lacked of funds to sufficiently meet their responsibilities to Anglophone candidates. This appeared to have made the GCE-board more receptive to SEEPD's proposals especially if they were to provide the Board with additional resources. **Nonetheless**, SEEPD also understood that whilst the GCE Board are encouraged to form partnerships and accept donations, they would not collaborate with CSOs that have the potential to threaten the current government in power. Being under the tutelage if the MoE, the GCE Board is unauthorised to create policies that contradict Cameroonian law. Hence, SEEPD had to ensure that their demands aligned with the values of the Cameroonian state.

Consequently, SEEPD's donation of an embosser was well received by the GCE Board as it improved their capacity to conduct fair examination conditions and proved that the Board was complying to the UN's CRDP which the state had signed.

Moreover, the donation of an embosser showed that SEEPD would be a valuable partner to the Board and as a result SEEPD were recognised as the official representative of candidates with impairments (143).

Whilst, the donation of an embosser also acted as catalyst for policy change, it was the GCE Board's semi-autonomous status that ultimately enabled SEEPD to achieve this outcome. The central government permitted the GCE Board to act as a semi-autonomous actor which is permitted to create its own policy as long as it does not contradict the authority of its titular ministry. This semi-autonomous status empowered the GCE Board to create policies that allowed candidates with impairments to have additional time. The GCE Board's relatively independent autonomy proved to be a valuable mechanism for SEEPD as they were not required to lobby to the centralised Ministry of Secondary Education.

In summary, although the GCE Board did not have the financial capacity to braille examinations, their reciprocity to CSOs who did not threaten the current status quo enabled SEEPD to achieve their goals. The GCE Board's mandate to form partnerships with external stakeholders meant that this particular power-holder was inclined to be more receptive to an organisation bringing resources such as SEEPD. Whilst the donation of an embosser stimulated the GCE Board to enact policies that recognised and benefitted CWDs, these changes were facilitated by the Board's semi-independent status that enabled them to control policies for examinations.

6.4 Outcome 4: Partnerships with Councils

This section uncovers how the POS enabled SEEPD to achieve various legislative outcomes with Councils that went beyond sensitisation. Chapter 5 mentioned that 3 Northwest municipal Councils began '*to support education for learners with impairments*' (17) by creating policies that ensured all future state buildings have universal access and financially supporting CWDs. Moreover, SEEPD directly targeted Councils in their Phase 3 strategy. This resulted in 18 councils signing MoUs and Action Plans and 15 Councils appointing Focal Persons. The remainder of this section discusses how decentralisation enabled SEEPD to achieve these outcomes whilst a strong political output structure and the electoral system facilitated these results but

also threatened their sustainability.

Chapter 5 explained how Councils are entitled to create legislation and collect taxes within their own municipality. Cameroon's 2004 law on decentralisation and the creation of Councils in 2007 provided SEEPD with an additional opening to conduct lobby and advocacy activities. The process of decentralisation empowered local community representatives to create legislation concerning education within their division or sub-division (municipality). However, these policies must not contradict laws made by the central administration. Hence, legislative authority granted to Councils enabled SEEPD to achieve policy outcomes as three Councils created policies related to universal access for all state buildings and it enabled 18 Councils to enter a partnership with SEEPD following the signing of MoUs.

Similar to other Anglophone power-holders, the unfinished process of decentralisation gave Councils greater responsibilities but they lacked the necessary financial resources and capacities to successfully govern their own municipality (political output structure). This enabled SEEPD to achieve legislative outcomes as Councils believed that creating policies or signing MoUs may guarantee them greater resources. This lack of capacity also enabled SEEPD to persuade Councils to appoint a Focal Person which they would train. SEEPD's ability to provide additional training to government workers appealed to Councils as this would be a cost free way to improve the capacity of their staff.

However, partial decentralisation initiated by the 2004 law limited Councils' overall capacities to meet SEEPD's demands. To elaborate, Councils currently have difficulty managing basic projects such as road construction and would have greater difficulty providing the necessary materials required for inclusive education (FDG3). Councils' source of income comprises of taxes generated from markets within their division and some funds from the Ministry of Territorial Administration (FDG3). Counsellors and Traditional Authorities (FDG3) explained that the Ministry of Territorial Decentralisation distributes funds later than promised. Additionally, revenue generated from the markets is barely enough to sustain Council salaries let alone fund community projects. Community leaders emphasised that Councils have been provided with legislative authority and responsibility within their municipality

but they do not have the necessary material resources to govern (FDG3).

However, Councils can collaborate with Parliamentarians who are entitled to submit bids for development projects of up to 8 million francs and they are encouraged to source for external funds. (I53) Yet, Mayors (I23 and I39) noted that their fund-raising abilities are not to the standards of CSOs and Parliamentarians tend to bid for projects that immediately benefit the entire community rather than spend money on a marginalised groups.

Furthermore, Councils are a unique power-holder in that they are elected every 5 years. The theoretical framework hypothesised that a greater the number of parties in an electoral system is more likely to bring benefits to CSOs. This assumption was partially true as Councillors and Mayors appeared to be continuously conscious of future elections with one Mayor noting that *'we are struggling to win the vote of the people, other people they may come in and work harder than you'* (I22). Consequently, SEEPD capitalised on Mayors' and Counsellors' electoral concerns in order to achieve alternative outcomes. SEEPD claimed that Councils tend to think that *'if we (councils) cater to their (CWDs) needs during the next elections they are going to vote for us again.'* (I16). Furthermore, SEEPD considered that Councils that created policies favouring CWDs were likely to be motivated by the positive publicity they would receive from SEEPD's communication component. One participant explained that that it *'is in their (Councils) interests to work with us because it gives them more activities to carry out and we can do coverage'* (I1).

Parliamentarians and Mayors noted that citizens vote on the basis of a candidate's previous accomplishments rather than their party affiliations (I23 and I53). Whilst CWDs and their family may seem like a minority vote, the Northwest has been noted as an area where there is a high prevalence of CWDs¹⁵ and SEEPD have conveyed to Councils that their inability to cater to CWDs is the root cause of extreme poverty in their respective municipalities. Chapter 5 discussed how SEEPD also sensitised the wider community on issues pertaining to disability. As a result of mass sensitisation, even those not immediately affected by disability understand the

¹⁵ London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (2010) estimate that 10.5% of the population in the Northwest region are living with a disability.

importance of supporting CWDs and this could influence their vote in future elections. Hence, SEEPD have profited on the electoral concerns of Mayors and Councillors in order to achieve both policy and alternative outcomes.

Nonetheless, participants remained divided as to whether fresh elections with new Mayors and Councillors could negatively impact SEEPD's relationship with Councils or hinder ongoing projects. Although it is currently too early to assess whether future elections will impact the MoUs and Action Plans, some individuals feared a new Mayor may disturb the current partnership between SEEPD and the Council. The receptiveness of Councils depended on *'people and personalities'* (I3), which would suggest that SEEPD may have to rebuild their relationship if new politicians are elected.

Yet, others stated that MoUs and Action Plans are *'binding'* (I23). Appendix 7.2 shows that the MoUs are not the responsibility of one person but the Council as an entity. Whilst Mayors and Councillors can be elected out of office, Councils also have permanent members of staff such as the Secretary-General and the Focal Person. In addition, several participants highlighted that discarding the MoU would be a reckless decision to make as *'enables them to reach out to the masses'* (I3).

In light of the above, it appears to be that the implementation of these MoUs and Action Plans they will only be completely effective once the central government fully decentralises financial resources. In addition, the valid concerns regarding fresh elections contradict Xie and Van der Hejen's (2010) assumption that more elections provides more opportunities for CSOs to achieve outcomes. However, this study concludes that it is too early to provide a clear analysis as to how decentralisation and the nature of the electoral system has influenced SEEPD's ability to achieve outcomes as SEEPD have only begun to directly engage with the MoE in 2015.

6.5 Conclusions

The overall purpose of this study was to use the Political Opportunity Structure Theory to explain how SEEPD's outcomes were influenced by certain characteristics of the political system. The characteristics explored during this study were derived from Xie and Van der Hejen's (2010) framework that included formal institutional

structures, informal elite strategies, configuration of actors and political output structure.

This chapter found that partial decentralisation was the most significant characteristic of the POS that enabled SEEPD to achieve outcomes with power-holders based in the Anglophone regions (Regional Delegates, Councils and the GCE Board). This aspect of Cameroon's political system facilitated greater access to these power-holders as SEEPD were located within close proximity to Regional Delegates and Councils. Additionally, SEEPD benefitted from their association with CBC-HS whose reputation was strongest in the Anglophone regions. However, SEEPD's reputation was not strong in Cameroon's capital and access to the Ministry of National Education (MoE) remains problematic. Yet, SEEPD were able to partially mitigate this through approaching allies (configuration of actors) but they did not have the necessary resources or networks to achieve further outcomes with the MoE.

Nevertheless, partial decentralisation in Cameroon meant that these Anglophone power-holders have gained greater responsibility but do not have sufficient funds and skills (strong political output structure). This aspect of the POS enabled and restricted SEEPD's ability to gain outcomes for inclusive education. The reduced capabilities of Anglophone power-holders enabled SEEPD to gain agenda and alternatives outcomes as these power-holders were receptive to CSOs who bring in funds and capacity strengthening activities. However, the lack of financial resources challenged SEEPD's ability to implement inclusive education in the pilot schools and participants were doubtful as to whether this will affect the implementation of Action Plans with Councils.

Additionally, this chapter illustrated that informal elite strategies had a considerable impact on SEEPD's ability to achieve outcomes. This study found that SEEPD's key power-holders do not respond well to CSOs who threaten their authority. SEEPD were aware that their demands could not challenge or underestimate the authority of the Cameroon state and its government authorities. Moreover, power-holders also have considerable responsibilities and lack resources which meant they preferred to collaborate with CSOs. As a result, SEEPD offered

capacity building workshops or resources which helped them to fulfil their responsibilities to CWDs and strengthened their ability as government authorities.

Finally, the nature of the electoral system has enabled SEEPD to gain alternative and policy outcomes with Councils who were the only elected power-holder. The electoral concerns of Mayors and Councillors have offered opportunities for SEEPD. SEEPD considered that their ability to provide media coverage of for local politicians enabled them to convince Councils to either mainstream disability in their policies or sign MoUs and Action Plans. Whilst it has already been discussed that Councils lack of funds and capacity, future elections may also undermine the long-term sustainability of policy changes and MoUs.

Therefore, this analysis showed that partial decentralisation facilitated most of SEEPD's outcomes with Anglophone power-holders. However, SEEPD has also been hindered by fragmentary decentralisation as resources and overall authority remain with the MoE. It is also important to note that power-holders are primarily concerned with their ability to retain their position of authority. Consequently, power-holders preferred to assimilate CSOs such as SEEPD that helped to strengthen their position and SEEPD manipulated local politicians' desire to be re-elected.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

The development agendas of governments and international agencies have failed to address the educational needs of Children with Disabilities (CWDs). Civil society can play an important role in highlighting this problem by engaging in lobby and advocacy for changed institutional policies that would improve the quality of education for CWDs. However, the factors that shape the outcomes of lobby and advocacy for CWDs are not wholly understood, especially in non-Western contexts.

This study was conducted in cooperation with the African Studies Centre in Leiden and the Lilliane Foundation. As part of the project “Breaking down Barriers to Inclusion - Building Capacity for Lobby and Advocacy for Children with Disabilities”, this study seeks to gain a deeper insight as to why the Lilliane Foundation’s strategic partner in Cameroon (CBC-HS) were able to achieve certain outcomes in their SEEPD-Programme. This programme was started in 2009 and amongst other things aimed to realise inclusive education for CWDs in Cameroon.

This study sought to explain how external factors, specifically the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) shaped SEEPD’s ability to achieve lobby and advocacy outcomes. POS-theory focuses on the external environment in which social movements or civil society organisations conduct lobby and advocacy work. The main premise underlying POS-theory is that organisations rely on the political environment providing favourable conditions which enable CSOs to influence power-holders. The extent to whether “political opportunities” for influencing power-holders exist depends on the number of structural characteristics of the state’s political system. Consequently, the main research question for this study is:

How did the Cameroonian political opportunity structure shape the SEEPD-Programme’s ability to achieve lobby and advocacy outcomes in the period between 2009-March 2016?

This remainder of this chapter will answer the main research question, provide policy recommendations as well as reflecting on the effectiveness of the methods, theoretical framework and analysis operationalised for the purpose of this study.

7.2 Conclusion of Findings

7.2.1 Strategies & Outcomes

This study found that SEEPD realized the following four main lobby & advocacy outcomes:

1. Sensitisation of various Power-Holders (Agenda Outcome)

SEEPD were able to successfully sensitise Anglophone power-holders about the need for inclusive education. These included the GCE Board, Regional Delegates of Education and 18 Councils. There was some evidence to suggest that SEEPD were responsible for the sensitisation of the Ministry of Education (MoE) but due to conflicting opinions from participants it was not possible to confirm this claim.

Prior to directly contacting any power-holder, SEEPD ensured that there was a demand for inclusive education by reaching out to the general public and the media. This was achieved through mass media productions and CBC-HS's Community Rehabilitation Team (CBR). Following sufficient sensitisation of the grassroots in the Northwest, SEEPD held consultative workshops for the local education authorities (LEA) which included the Regional Delegates. Sensitisation of the GCE Board and Councils was achieved through direct meetings where SEEPD would present their objectives and explain the difficulties encountered by CWDs. Throughout all these activities, SEEPD emphasised that their demands for inclusive education were in line with the laws and regulations of the Cameroonian state.

2. Authorisation and Implementation of Pilot Schools (Alternative and Collective Outcomes)

Following the sensitisation of Regional Delegates, SEEPD were granted access to 17 government schools in the Northwest which they labelled their "14 Pilot Schools" for Inclusive Education. Authorisation had granted SEEPD with the necessary authority to transform at least one primary and one secondary school in each division within

the Northwest region into an inclusive school. The purpose of creating the pilot schools was twofold: Providing CWDs with fair and equal education opportunities and proving to government (specifically the MoE) that inclusive education is feasible. In order to achieve this result, SEEPD directly met with Regional Delegates following their completion of the consultative workshops.

At the time of research, SEEPD achieved partial implementation of inclusive education in the pilot schools. There were severe limitations, caused by a lack of financial resources. These resources were necessary to motivate teachers and provide the required technological appliances. SEEPD were able to partially mitigate this by approaching other stakeholders such as the Bamenda-Dordrecht Foundation for funds but this has not fully resolved the issue. Only one school was able to construct a resource centre. Yet, due to the pilot schools the number of CWDs attending school increased in the Northwest and the highest number of CWDs in the most successful school rose to 30.

3. Improved Examination Conditions for CWDs (Alternative, Policy, Implementation, Collective and Procedural)

SEEPD were able to improve Anglophone examination conditions for CWDs. The programme's main outcomes included changing examination policy which provided extra time for CWDs, ensuring that the Board produced braille examination scripts and persuading the Board to sign an MoU which solidified their continued partnership with SEEPD. The comparative study in pilot schools found that implementation of the GCE policy for 25% additional examination time was limited as this study found that there were CWDs at the pilot schools who were not aware of they were entitled to additional time.

SEEPD achieved these outcomes through direct engagement with the GCE Board. Whilst the GCE Board accepted SEEPD's proposals in theory, they initially feared that the proposed changes could threaten the fidelity of the examinations and they did not have the resources or expertise to braille examinations. Consequently, SEEPD agreed to braille examinations on behalf of the GCE Board which was followed by the donation of an embosser. The donation of the embosser appeared to act as a

catalyst as the GCE Board soon agreed to changing examination policy and signing an MoU with SEEPD.

4. Partnerships with Councils (Alternative, Policy and Institutional)

The final outcome achieved by SEEPD included creating partnerships with 18 Councils. This partnership included signing an MoU with Councils that promised they would collaborate with SEEPD and follow agreed Action Plans. SEEPD hoped that Action Plans would act as a precursor to further policy changes. Action Plans also designated the immediate appointment of a Focal person, 15 of whom were already trained by SEEPD at the time of research.

In order to achieve these outcomes, SEEPD collaborated with the CBR team who had already established trust with key Council representatives such as Mayors and Councillors. A representative from the CBR team alongside SEEPD met directly with Councils and explained the problem of disability in their community emphasising its connection to extreme poverty and how SEEPD can help them to overcome this issue. Following the signing of MoU and Action Plans, SEEPD conducted workshops with Mayors and recently appointed Focal Persons in order to develop their capacity and illustrate ways in which they can mainstream disability in their practices and policies.

7.2.2 SEEPD and the Political Opportunity Structure

According to POS-theory, the success of social movements is for an important part dependent on four key characteristics of the political regime in a given country:

1. *Formal Institutional Structures*: this refers to the number of access points available for a social movement to engage with power holders;
2. *Political Output Structure*: this refers to whether power-holders have the funds and capacity to meet the demands of social movements.
3. *Informal Elite Strategies*: this refers to the extent in which the political culture in a country tends towards cooperation and/or repression of social movements;
4. *Configuration of Power*: this refers to whether power-holders are divided or united in their position towards a social movement;

This study has examined to what extent, and how, the above characteristics of political regimes have affected the outcomes of the SEEPD-Programme.

Formal Institutional Structure

This study found that Cameroon's partially decentralised governance structure had a major impact on SEEPD's ability to achieve lobby & advocacy outcomes. For the implementation of education policy, the MoE in Cameroon relies on external power holders (the GCE Board, Councils and the Regional Delegates). Such power-holders have the authority to create and implement law, as long as this is in line with national law. In terms of geographical proximity, Councils and Regional Delegates operated close to SEEPD's headquarters. This not only greatly facilitated physical access to these power-holders, it also had a very positive effect on their and the GCE Board's willingness to listen to SEEPD's advocacy message. This is because CBC-HS has a particularly strong reputation and network in the Anglophone regions.

Another feature of the political system that seems to have worked in SEEPD's advantage is the fact that Councils appear to be sensitive to favourable publicity as their position depends on positive election outcomes. By being seen as creating and implementing policies that favour CWDs, Councils hope to generate such publicity. SEEPD profited from this electoral motive by conducting follow-up with Councils' actions in the field of inclusive education through their media strategy. At the same time, SEEPD's media strategy of mass sensitization in the Northwest helped to put inclusive education in the public eye. A general concern remains, however, whether SEEPD's investments in the Councils will be compromised by future elections. It is currently unclear whether a new Mayor or Councillors will uphold the MoUs made with SEEPD.

In relation to the theoretical framework posited in Chapter 2, this study found that structures which provided more openings or easy access did not always equate to straight-forward outcomes for inclusive education. Whilst decentralisation largely provided positive outcomes with SEEPD through easy access to Anglophone power-holders, the electoral system has the potential to negatively impact SEEPD's progress with Councils.

Political Output Structure

The way in which Cameroon has decentralised is such that most power-holders targeted by SEEPD (Councils, Regional Delegates, GCE Board) have considerable responsibility and authority but lack sufficient funds and capacity. This had a favourable influence on SEEPD's ability to gain authorisation for inclusive education. The lack of funds and capacity made these power-holders receptive to SEEPD's advocacy message of inclusive education. Councils and the GCE Board are expected to work with CSOs as they provide resources, services or funding for development projects that fit their mandate. By working with SEEPD, power-holders gain access to resources and can fulfil their responsibilities.

While the lack of resources has made the above power-holders receptive to SEEPD, it also had a constraining effect. Whilst SEEPD achieved several impressive outcomes, the implementation of inclusive education in the Northwest continues to remain dependent on the resources brought in by SEEPD and its donors. This raises doubts as to whether the achievements can be sustained and up-scaled. To achieve this, SEEPD required the recognition and funding from the central government or MoE. SEEPD has been aware of this and also sought to reach out to the MoE which is responsible for making national education policy and controls the national education budget.

SEEPD encountered significant difficulties accessing the MoE at the national level in Yaoundé. In this sense, the original assumption that grassroots successes would eventually be picked up by the MoE was a bit too optimistic. In hindsight, this is understandable as CBC-HS's reputation and network is much stronger in the Anglophone regions than in Francophone Yaoundé. Moreover, CBC-HS's track record has traditionally been in the area of health, not education. To mitigate these constraints, SEEPD tried to reach out to the MoE via other individuals in its network. As of yet, this has not resulted in more resources being channelled to the power-holders that collaborate with SEEPD. Interestingly, however, the MoE did launch its own pilot school initiative for inclusive education in 2015 in cooperation with the INGO Sight Savers due to the resources they could offer the MoE. There are different views amongst interviewees as to whether this initiative is causally linked to the sensitising efforts of SEEPD.

Hence, the findings show that this particular dimension can work in reverse as the reduced capacity of power-holders enabled SEEPD to gain certain outcomes. Moreover, this study highlighted that the political output structure is influenced by decentralisation. Partial decentralisation has limited the financial capacity of power-holders as financial resources and overall legislative authority remained with the MoE based in Yaoundé.

Informal Elite Strategies

The political culture in Cameroon is such that CSOs that openly challenge the authority of governmental bodies are not tolerated. This means that organisations using lobby and advocacy to achieve their goals must be careful in how they engage power-holders. Confrontational strategies are clearly not an option. At the same time, the fact that power-holders have considerable responsibilities but lack resources makes them more receptive towards cooperation with civil society organizations as explained above.

Moreover, power-holders such as the Councils, Delegates and GCE Board have the authority to create and implement policies, as long as new policy fits within the framework of national policy. This means that careful advocacy is possible, as long as demands are in line with national law. SEEPD has been very aware of this limitation and has always made sure in its communication with power-holders that inclusive education is in line with national Cameroonian law.

These findings did not contradict the theoretical assumptions outlined in Chapter 2 as power-holders' tendency to assimilate CSOs facilitated SEEPD's ability to achieve outcomes. The theoretical framework hypothesised that young democracies such as Cameroon tend to repress CSOs that challenge their authority and this study found that SEEPD were successful as they explained to power-holders that their demands would not threaten the current status quo.

Configuration of Actors

Overall, the divisions between power-holders played a significant role in helping SEEPD to achieve outcomes. This study shows that the Cameroonian government should not be seen as a monolithic entity. Different power-holders have distinct

perspectives, locations, interests and authority. As mentioned earlier, there are also different motives that have informed power-holders' responses to SEEPD (e.g. funding, support in implementing policy, electoral concerns).

However, it appears to be that the lack of a shared regional or Anglophone identity hindered SEEPD's earlier attempts to meet with power-holders such as the MoE which is based in Yaoundé and mainly comprises of Francophones. Additionally, SEEPD's association with the Baptist convention (CBC-HS), a well-established religious, Anglophone charity, helped to attract power-holders such as Councils, the LEA and the GCE Board who share a similar regional identity which made them more receptive towards SEEPD.

These findings contradict the assumptions made by Xie and Van der Hejen (2010) who state that the greater the divisions between power-holders, the easier it is to achieve outcomes. Whilst divisions meant that SEEPD had more opportunities to conduct lobby and advocacy activities, they also had to pander to different needs created by these divisions in order to achieve outcomes.

7.3 Policy Recommendations

The policy recommendations emerge from the conclusions of this study and aim to take lessons learnt from the SEEPD-Programme to provide a better understanding of how to take advantage of the political system in order to make lobby and advocacy gains for CWDs.

- 1) Start close to your headquarters:** SEEPD achieved outcomes quickly and using minimal resources by accessing power-holders located within the Northwest regions (namely Regional Delegates and the LEA) and profited from CBC-HS's reputation. Consequently, SEEPD managed to quickly develop models such as the pilot schools. This outcome helped to build SEEPD's reputation and attracted Councils to support SEEPD's work on inclusive education without direct engagement.
- 2) Play the electoral card:** SEEPD were aware that the highest concern of elected power-holders is re-election. Hence, if CSOs wish to achieve lobby

and advocacy outcomes they must pander to electoral concerns. The SEEPD-Programme were able to do this by the applying the following steps:

- a. Linking mass sensitisation to advocacy (making the general public concerned about disability)
- b. Suggesting activities elected power-holders can do to resolve this issue (e.g. appointing a Focal Person)
- c. Using media connections to see if power-holders have followed on these promises and broadcasting power-holders' progress to the general public

3) Recruit staff or volunteers from the government: If CSOs wish to ensure that their policies or agreements with power-holders are implemented they should recruit people already working within the sector. SEEPD's Education Advisor was also a teacher within a government school. Her continuous presence in GBHS Bamenda helped to ensure that agreements regarding inclusive education were implemented within this particular pilot school.

4) Research and understand the limitations of power-holders: One of the key lessons to learn from SEEPD's pilot school project is that inclusive education is resource intensive and requires substantial funding. This study proved that countries where power-holders have reduced financial resources can benefit and hinder CSOs. CSOs with limited resources tend to be limited in what they can achieve for inclusive education. However, CSOs can advocate for changes that are not resource heavy such as additional examination time or making small changes to the national curriculum.

7.4 Reflections

Firstly, the qualitative methods used for this study were suitable to collect the required data for this study. However, the decision to construct a chronological timeline of SEEPD's activities and outcomes proved to be difficult for several reasons. Documentation study provided limited information as there were few

reports which did include the dates of when certain outcomes or activities occurred. Moreover, methods such as semi-structured interview and H-Diagrams sometimes produced conflicting reports in regards to dates. This was due to the fact that most participants from SEEPD joined the organization in 2015.

A further complication was the difficulty in finding participants who felt comfortable discussing Anglophone/Francophone relations and decentralisation. This study was unable to fully comprehend how Anglophone/Francophone relations affected SEEPD's campaign for inclusive education. Consequently, the relation between linguistic divisions and how this can affect the ability of civil society to achieve lobby and advocacy outcomes remains a relevant topic for future research.

Secondly, the conceptual scheme and theoretical framework provided a useful starting-point to examine the case-study and collect data. Overall, the dimensions proved to be relevant in non-Western contexts. However, the relations between dimensions and outcomes did not always work as hypothesized in the theory. For example, a strong political output structure did not necessarily restrict the lobby and advocacy work of CSOs. Additionally, this study found the various dimensions of the POS model to be inter-related, hence, future studies using POS-theory in Cameroon should take into account that these dimensions are not always separate entities.

The most challenging aspect of the theoretical framework concerned Kolb's (2007) categorization of outcomes. Kolb's (2007) definition was based on examples such as the civil rights movement or the nuclear movement. Both of these movements target the national state as power-holders. Subsequently, Kolb's typology of outcomes does not take into consideration that different outcomes can be achieved simultaneously at different levels. This proved to be significant in the Cameroonian context where local, regional and national policy changes regarding inclusive education led to differentiations in policy e.g. the GCE Board is a collective outcome but it only applies to Anglophone speakers who are a minority in Cameroon.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Operationalisation Table

Concept	Dimension	Variable	Indicator
Outcomes	Substantive Outcomes	Agenda Impact	When did the SEEPD Program become known to power-holders?
			When did inclusive education become a pressing issue for power-holders?
			Why did the SEEPD Program generate greater attention from public and power holders?
			How did the SEEPD program generate greater attention from public and power holders?
		Alternatives Impact	Were CBC-HS able to influence the content of policy proposals?
			When did CBC-HS notice that the SEEPD Program had influenced the content of policy proposals?
			How did CBC-HS influence the content of policy proposals?
		Policy Impact	How was CBC-HS's SEEPD Program adopted by new policy-makers?
			What factors facilitated the SEEPD Program being adopted by new policy-makers?
			When did the SEEPD Program become adopted into policy?
		Implementation Impact	Has CBC-HS been included with the implementation of policy?
			When was CBC-HS included in the implementation of policy?
What is CBC-HS's role in implementing policy?			

		Good Impact	Has the SEEPD Program created any positive change that benefited the collective good of CWDs or their
			When did beneficiaries experience the benefit of th
			Was the change long-lasting?
	Institutional Outcomes	Procedural Outcomes	Did the relationship between CWDs and power-hold
			Was the SEEPD Program responsible for this change
			Are SEEPD accepted formally recognized/accepted representative of CWDs?
			When did this relationship change?
			Why did this relationship change?
			Are SEEPD/CWDs involved in the procedures of form
		Institutional Changes	Which formal decisions have CWDs been included in
			Did the SEEPD Program facilitate their involvement?
			When did CWDs (or a representative) become invol
			Why are CWDs involved in this kind of formal decisi
			Was the SEEPD Program responsible for the creatio
		State Transformation	When was the new sub-institution formed?
Why was this new sub-institution formed?			
Do CWDs have their own sub-institution e.g. separa department?			

			What were CBC's initial demands of power- holders
Strategy	Elements affecting strategy	Demands	Did CBC's demands change?
			Why did CBC change their demands?
			Were the demands feasible?
			Where did CBC lobby for their demands for the SEEI
		Arena of action	Why do they lobby here?
			Has the arena for lobby and advocacy changed?
			Was the arena easy to access?
			Which other organizations did CBC work with on the
		Stakeholder	Why did they decide to interact with these organiza
			How did these other stakeholders help CBC to achie Program?
			How did CBC interact with these other stakeholders
			Were power holders influenced by interests associa
	Direct Tactics	Power holders	Did the power holders themselves have any self-inte (personal cause)
			Did power holders share similar values to CBC-HS (r
			Were power holders united or divided?
			Did power holders have the capacity to support CBC
			Who are the power holders?
			Who are the allies of power holders?

	Indirect Tactics	Allies	How did CBC-HS influence the ally?
			How did the allies influence the behaviour of power
			Why did CBC-HS contact the ally rather than the po
			Did the ally share similar values to CBC-HS?
			How do the public perceive children with disabilities
		Public Opinion	Do the public generally share similar values to CBC-l
			How did CBC influence the general public?
			How did the general public influence the behaviour
			What is the degree of territorial decentralization be local level?
Political Context	Formal Institutional Structure	Decentralization	Has decentralization created more access points for
			How did the decentralized/centralized system influe Program?
			How did the decentralized/centralized system influe Program?
			What is the relationship between the legislative, ex
		Degree of Separation	Which system is easy/difficult for CBC-HS to access :
			Which systems did CBC-HS lobby too? And why?
			Does CBC-HS work within a one party or multi-party
		Nature of the electoral system	What are the rules of the voting system in question?
			Did power holders try and prevent CBC from their lc

	Informal Elite Strategies (strategies of power holders)	Exclusive Strategies	How did they exclude CBC from influencing power h
			Why did they exclude CBC and their SEEPD Program
			Which power holders included CBC in their strategy
		Inclusive Strategies	How did they include CBC in their strategy?
			Why did they include CBC in their strategy?
			Were power holders united or divided?
	Configuration of power	Relationship between power holders	How did CBC use this relationship for their strategy?
			Did the relationship between power holders make l for CBC?
			How do power holders interact with their allies?
		Relationship between power holders and allies	How did CBC-HS benefit/not benefit from this relati
			Who are the allies of power holders and why are th
			Do power holders have the capacity to execute and
	Political Output Structure	Capacity of power holders	Which power holders have the capacity to support t
			Why do they have the capacity to support the SEEPI
			How have CBC benefitted from the capacity of powe

Appendix 2: List of Participants**Semi-Structured Interviews**

Number	Description	Organisation	Date Conducted
I1	Programme Officer Communications	SEEPD	18/1/16
I2	Programme Officer Child Protection	SEEPD	18/1/16
I3	Programme Officer Community	SEEPD	19/1/16
I4	Programme Officer Education	SEEPD	19/1/16
I5	Education Advisor	SEEPD	20/1/16
I6	Pedagogic Inspector for Basic Education	Bamenda, Ministry of Secondary Education	20/1/16
I7	Deputy Programme Manager	SEEPD	22/1/16
I8	Finance Officer	SEEPD	25/1/16
I9	Programme Officer	EDID	25/1/16
I10	Director	Teacher Training College	26/1/16
I11	Principle	GBHS Bamenda	26/1/16
I12	Programme Officer Gender	SEEPD	27/1/16
I13	Programme Manager	SEEPD	27/1/16

I14	Former Communications Officer	SEEPD	28/1/16
I15	Lead Person	GBHS Bamenda	1/2/16
I16	Programme Director	CBC-HS	1/2/16
I17	Programme Manager	EDID	1/2/16
I18	Programme Manager	CBR	1/2/16
I19	Principle	GBHS Bamenda	2/2/16
I20	Former Communications Officer/ Current Programme Officer (Clubfoot)	SEEPD	3/2/16
I21	CBR Field Worker	Mbengwi	4/2/16
I22	Quarter Head (Traditional Authority)	Mbengwi	4/2/16
I23	Mayor	Bamenda 2 Council	5/2/16
I24	Funder	Dordrecht Foundation	5/2/16
I25	Divisional Delegate for Secondary Education	Bamenda 2 Division, Ministry of Secondary Education	9/2/16
I26	Director	Association of Persons with Disabilities	10/2/16
I27	Quarter Head (Traditional Authority)	Bamenda	10/2/16
I28	Former Programme Manager/ Current Programme Officer	SEEPD and Site Savers	12/2/16
I29	Director	Centre for Inclusive Studies	12/2/16

I30	Teacher	Government Pilot School for Basic Education	15/2/16
I31	Pastor	SEEPD, Bamenda	15/2/16
I32	Imam	Bamenda Mosque	15/2/16
I33	Regional Delegate for Secondary Education	Ministry of Secondary Education, Northwest Region	15/2/16
I34	Focal Person	Bamenda 2 Council	16/2/16
I35	Journalist	Radio Aquaba	16/2/16
I36	Programme Officer	SAJOCAH	16/2/16
I37	Principle	GBHS Mbengwi	17/2/16
I38	Divisional Delegate for Secondary Education	Momo	17/2/16
I39	Mayor	Mbengwi	17/2/16
I40	Focal Person	Mbengwi Council	17/2/16
I41	Director	CEFED	18/2/16
I42	Director	SENTI	18/2/16
I43	Registrar	GCE Board	19/2/16
I44	Inspector for Basic Education and Head Teacher	Pilot School for Basic Education Site Saver	19/2/16
I45	Resource Room Director	GBHS Bamenda	22/2/16
I46	Director	Teacher Training College Bambili	22/2/16
I47	Programme Manager	WINHEEDCAM	22/2/16

I48	Lead Person	GBHS Mbengwi	24/2/16
I49	Student (male) and Parent	GBHS Mbengwi	24/2/16
I50	Student (female) and Parent	GBHS Mbengwi	24/2/16
I51	Pastor	Mbengwi, Pastor	24/2/16
I52	Journalist	Rainbow Radio Mbengwi	24/2/16
I53	Parliamentarian	Mbengwi	25/2/16
I54	General-Delegate	Ministry of Secondary Education, Yaoundé	1/3/16
I55	Programme Director	PROMHAMICAM	1/3/16
I56	Programme Director	CJARC	1/3/16
I57	PTA President	GBHS Bamenda	22/3/16
I58	Country Coordinator	CBM	28/3/16

Power-Mapping

Number	Description	Organisation	Date Conducted
PM1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 4 adults - 3 male/1 female - Split into two groups - Senior and junior staff 	SEEPD	27/1/16
PM2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 4 adults - 4 female - Senior and junior staff 	SEEPD	27/1/16
PM2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 3 adults - 2 male/1 female - Senior and junior staff 	SENTTI	2/3/16

Focus Group Discussions

Number	Description	Organisation	Date Conducted
FDG1	- 4 adults - Senior staff	SEEPD	27/1/16
FDG2	- 7 children - 2 male/5 female	GBHS Bamenda	3/2/16
FDG3	- 8 adults - 3 Councillors - 5 Traditional Authorities - All male	Bamenda 2 Community Leaders	18/2/16

H-Diagrams

Number	Description	Organisation	Date Conducted
HD1	- 6 adults - 5 female/ 1 male - Junior staff (officers)	SEEPD	3/2/16
HD2	- 3 Adults - 2 male/1 female - Teachers	GBHS Bamenda	3/2/16
HD3	- 6 Adults - 4 female/2 male - Teachers	GBHS Mbengwi	17/2/16

Appendix 3: Interview and Focus Group Guides

Appendix 3.1: Introductory Statement

My name is Zuleikha and this is my colleague Sebastian, we are here today to ask a series of questions regarding the work of CBC-HS which will help to contribute to our research project. Our research focuses on SEEPD and we hope to offer recommendations to CBC-HS as to how to move forward with this program. Firstly, can I begin by asking some general questions about yourself...

Appendix 3.2: Interview Guide for Education Authorities, Stakeholders and SEEPD

General Information

What is your profession/position?

For how long are you in that position?

Can you give me an overview of SEEPD's work with your school?

(How well do you know CBCHS and SEEPD?)

(Are you aware of the pilot schools, work with the GCE Board, sensitisation)

(What is your relation to CBCHS and SEEPD?)

What was your impression of SEEPD and CBCHS before they approached you?

Strategy (Activities)

How did CBCHS/SEEPD approach you? Who was the contact person?

(Did CBCHS approach you directly or through a third party)

Why did you come to the workshop? How did you motivate teachers to attend the workshop?

How do you think CBCHS achieved their goals concerning Inclusive Education in the SEEPD-Programme?

Why do you think was that?

Can you give a concrete example?

Why did or why did you not change your behaviour after CBCHS approached you?

Which SEEPD activities influenced your behaviour? And why?

e.g. workshops, meetings...

What was missing in their engagement that you didn't change your behaviour?

- Why do you think was that?
- Can you give an example?

How has their relation to the school and yourself changed over time from 2012 to 2015?

What moments are key for you for the success of the strategy, and when will they occur?

Can you tell me how different people within the schools implement IE?
(teacher, lead persons, children etc)

To what extent do caretakers/parents participate in the activities?

Are there any other important actors involved in implementing IE in the school?
(PTA, FONS, focal person in council)

How did the resource centre help you implement IE?

Outcomes (Success)

Can you tell me about the results of the SEEPD Programme in your school?

- Can you give concrete examples? e.g. resource centre
- How do you think it came to happen? e.g. workshop
- What was your role in this process? e.g. facilitated workshop, sensitised parents?

What did or could you actually do to make that result possible or not?

- Can you give a concrete example?

Were there any unexpected results?

- Can you give concrete examples?

How feasible is the SEEPD Project? Can it be continued in other schools in Cameroon? And why?

Political Context

How has the political system enabled SEEPD's success? Has the political system prevented SEEPD's success?

Who can make inclusive education become a reality in Cameroon? Who are the most powerful government actors in Cameroon?

Are these power-holders easy to access?

Why would a power-holder be receptive to SEEPD's message? Why are these power-holders not receptive to SEEPD's message?

Are power-holders general receptive to civil society organisations?

Do different political parties influence SEEPD's ability to achieve outcomes?

Should SEEPD be concerned about the impact of fresh elections?

Does the separation of power between the executive, judicial and legislative system influence SEEPD's lobby and advocacy work?

Do power-holders share the same aims and values?

Is it easier to access Anglophone power-holders or Francophone power-holders?

How has decentralization influenced SEEPD's work?

Who are SEEPD's allies within the government?

Do you think power-holders have the capacity (finances and skills) to respond to SEEPD's demands for inclusive education?

Taking the dimensions we have discussed into account, what should SEEPD do in order to ensure that inclusive education is successfully practised in government schools across Cameroon?

Interview Guides for Children with Disabilities

When did you start attending this school and why?

Are your parents or yourself supported by CBCHS?

Are your parents supportive of your schooling?

Did you notice any changes in your education from 2012 to 2015?

Is the school and classes accessible to you?

How does the school help you to learn with your disability?

How do the teachers create an enabling environment for you to learn?

Do you use the resource centre?

How do you interact with other students? Are they supportive?

Do you listen to CBCHS Radio shows? Do you think they've helped to sensitise others?

Do you get extra time or support during the exams?

Interview Guides for Parents of Children with Disabilities

Can you tell me about your experiences with CBCHS? How have they helped you and your child?

How has SEEPD helped your child to continue their education?

Have the government or traditional leaders provided you with any support considering you have a child living with a disability?

Is it important to you that CBCHS has a religious background?

How have CBCHS helped to sensitize yourself and the community you live in?

Do you listen to CBCHS Radio?

What do you think of the resource room?

Do you think that you will vote for the same Councillors because he has worked with CBCHS and begun to implement IE?

Do you think it is feasible for the council to implement IE in other schools?

Appendix 3.2: Focus Group Discussion/Discussion Questions for H-Diagrams

SEEPD and Stakeholders (Teachers and Community Leaders)

How well did SEEPD meet their aims and purposes from the second phase onwards for IE?

How important were workshops for meeting the aims of SEEPD's Inclusive Education Programme?

- Workshops for educational authorities
- Workshops for teachers in the NW region
- Workshops with Mayors

How well did public campaigns and sensitisation help to achieve the aims of SEEPD's Inclusive Education project?

How important are networks in achieving the aims of the SEEPD Project?

How effective do you think the bottom-up or grassroots approach is for implementing Inclusive Education in Cameroon?

How important are financial means to achieving the aims of SEEPD regarding Inclusive Education?

How feasible is Inclusive Education for other divisions in Cameroon?

How important are the councils in the NW region for implementing IE in Cameroon?

Focus Group Discussions: Children with Disabilities

What do you know about IE in your school?

What have your teachers taught you about helping students with disabilities?

How do you interact and support other students living with disabilities?


What do your parents know about disability?

Do you listen to SEEPD's radio shows on disability?

Appendix 4: Power- Maps


Appendix 4.1: Power-Map, SEEPD, Group 1

(Actors with the tallest tower held the greater financial and legislative power)





Appendix 4.2: Power-Map, SEEPD, Group 2

(Actors with the tallest tower held the greater financial and legislative power)



Appendix 4.3: Power-Map, SENTTI

(Actors with the most cookies and coins held the greater financial and legislative power)



Appendix 5: Council Documentation

Appendix 5.1: Example of Memorandum of Understanding

This memorandum of understanding is entered into this day _____

Between

The Cameroon Baptist Convention Health Board (CBCHB) Socio Economic Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (SEEPD) (hereinafter referred to as the SEEPD Program) represented by Prof Tih Pius Muffih, Director

On the one hand, and,

The Jakiri Council (Hereinafter referred to as The Council) represented by Mr. Jaff Romanus Verkijika, Mayor

On the other hand

ARTICLE 1: INTRODUCTION

The Belo Council and the SEEPD Program have commonalities. In the commitment to promote local development and improving the living conditions of their inhabitants, both parties are so similar that a partnership framework is required to bolster complementarities. Collaboration will be established within the principles set out in the following section, which will be reviewed by both parties every two years. This Memorandum of Understanding is focused on supporting the council in pursuing inclusive development.

ARTICLE 2: GOAL, PURPOSE, SCOPE AND COMPOSITION

- 2.1 Goal:** *The Goal of this cooperation is to foster collaboration in achieving comprehensive inclusive development.*
- 2.2 Purpose:** *The purpose is to provide the Council with skills in Inclusive Development as a way of ensuring effective disability mainstreaming in her Mandate.*
- 2.3 Scope:** *The general area of interest will be health and social development, economic development and education, sports and cultural development*
- 2.4 Composition:** *The collaboration involves 2 groups:*
 - *The leadership and staff of the Council*
 - *Qualified staff of the SEEPD Program with working experience in inclusive development*

The parties agree as follow:

ARTICLE 3: GENERAL PROVISIONS

The parties in entering into this memorandum recognise that they share a common interest in promoting and facilitating the sustainable improvement of the quality of life for an increasing number of people with disabilities in the Northwest Region of Cameroon.

This memorandum is written within the context of partnering with councils in implementing different interventions aimed at achieving inclusive development whose positive outcomes are expected to be far reaching on the social inclusion of persons with disabilities in development. During the term of this memorandum, the strategy may be reviewed and any new strategy will recognise the role of the Council and the SEEPD Program.

ARTICLE 4: RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARTIES

4.1 The responsibilities of the SEEPD Program are to:

- 4.1.1 Assist the Council in the design of an inclusive development action plan.
- 4.1.2 Provide the council with capacity in disability Inclusive development through workshops.
- 4.1.3 Develop the capacity of the Council in the areas of prevention/rehabilitation of disabilities by training volunteers for the council.
- 4.1.4 Develop and produce messages on prevention of disabilities.
- 4.1.5 Design and implement campaigns on the safe usage of motorbikes.
- 4.1.6 Liaise with community combined outreach teams to bring to the Council's municipality, services aimed at preventing/treating and rehabilitating disabilities. It is anticipated that this move will meet the needs of the poorest of the poor within our municipalities.
- 4.1.7 Provide capacities for livelihood to persons with disabilities identified within the Council's municipality and also expose them to micro credit opportunities within the Program.
- 4.1.8 Support employers within the Council's municipality in developing inclusive recruitment policies.
- 4.1.9 Present half yearly Progress reports to the leadership of the council on the progress of inclusive development initiative done within the framework of this collaboration.
- 4.1.10 Support the council in developing inclusive policies in all her priority areas.
- 4.1.11 Seek funding for providing continuous capacity development to the council in the area of Inclusive development. This will be a key measure in supporting the council meet her development objectives while contributing in the attainment of Cameroon's strategic goals.
- 4.1.12 Organise community sign language classes at the request of the Council
- 4.1.13 Develop and print materials on child abuse and management and also provide legal support in the management of alleged cases of child abuse.

4.2 The responsibilities of the Council are to:

- 4.2.1 Take lead in the organising community outreaches.
- 4.2.2 Recruit and propose volunteers to the SEEPD Program for training.
- 4.2.3 Be fully responsible financially her volunteers trained by the SEEPD Program.
- 4.2.4 Support the education of children with disabilities in the Council's municipality by providing material assistance, relevant didactic materials and assistive devices.
- 4.2.5 Employ support staff for the inclusive education resource room in inclusive education pilot schools.
- 4.2.6 Financially assist with the organisation of inclusive education open days.
- 4.2.7 Mainstream disability in the Council's policies and action plans.
- 4.2.8 Mainstream disability in interventions undertaken by other development stakeholders within her municipality. Facilitate the participation of persons with disabilities in the

democratisation process by facilitating the acquisition by Persons with Disabilities of relevant documents such as birth certificates and disability cards

- 4.2.9 Identify and report cases of alleged child abuse to the Program.
- 4.2.10 Institute measures for universal access into built up areas and information and communication.

4.3 Shared responsibilities of both parties are as follows;

- 4.3.1 To jointly subsidise vocational training for very poor persons with disabilities within the Council's jurisdiction
- 4.3.2 To jointly put in place measures to promote the rights and responsibilities of persons with disabilities within the Council's municipality
- 4.3.3 To jointly set up systems for ensuring child safeguarding and child protection within the Council's municipality
- 4.3.4 To jointly engage campaigns on the prevention of disabilities
- 4.3.5 To jointly organise seminars, conferences or workshops on topics of mutual interest and to invite each other's stakeholders
- 4.3.6 To jointly propose and engage in research sponsored by funding agencies, and to invite each other's stakeholders to participate therein.

ARTICLE 5: DURATION

- 5.1 *The present Memorandum of Understanding has a four year duration beginning January 2015 and ending December 2018.***

ARTICLE 6: FUNCTIONING MODALITIES

- 6.1 *Both parties are committed to each other's success and agree to work together to achieve outcomes consistent with the objective.***
- 6.2 *Work in a spirit of co-operation with each other while respecting boundaries in roles and functions.***
- 6.3 *Adopt a no surprise approach by keeping each other advised in a timely manner of any matter which either party becomes aware of that may significantly affect the work being undertaken by the other party.***
- 6.4 *The parties agree that the way to ensure an optimum outcome of the objective for each identified work-stream is to identify three categories of relationship:***
 - 6.4.1 Co-operative: Those work-streams currently undertaken or to be undertaken in the future on which the parties should work together to advance the objective.
 - 6.4.2 Neutral: Those work-streams currently undertaken or to be undertaken in the future of which both parties should be aware, but where co-operation between the parties is not required to advance the work-stream; and
 - 6.4.3 **Independent:** Those work-streams currently undertaken or to be undertaken in the future that both parties agree need to be pursued independently in order for statutory responsibilities to be performed.

ARTICLE 7: RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

Parties shall endeavor to resolve any dispute in a timely manner and in the way that best supports the sustainable empowerment of persons with disabilities. For that reason, where disputes arise between the parties, they shall be resolved in an amicable manner in accordance with the following timeframes and hierarchy of instances;

- 7.1.1 A meeting of frontline personnel of SEEPD and the Council where the dispute is not resolved within one week, it shall be forwarded to the next higher instance.
 - 7.1.2 The next higher instance shall be the meeting of the SEEPD Program Manager and the Council's Director. Where the dispute is not resolved within one week, it shall be forwarded to the next higher instance.
 - 7.1.3 The next higher instance shall be a meeting of the Director of CBC Health Services and the Mayor of Jakiri Council.
- 7.2 **Solutions to disputes are required to be consistent with the roles and mandates of each party.**
 - 7.3 **The proceedings of any instance of the conflict resolution meeting shall be documented in the form of minutes, a copy of which is given to each party within one week after the last date of the meeting.**

ARTICLE 8: REPORTING

- 8.1 **The Program shall share updates with the Council in matters of inclusive development.**
- 8.2 **The Council shall be a member of the SEEPD Program's Stakeholders Committee and shall be invited to attend 6-monthly stakeholder meetings.**

ARTICLE 9: OWNERSHIP OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT

- 9.1 ***All research works resulting from the present collaboration shall adequately acknowledge both parties including funding organisations in case of external funding.***
- 9.2 ***The data, materials and results of research works resulting from this partnership with funding from the SEEPD Program are the shared property of the Christian Blind Mission (CBM), the Cameroon Baptist Convention Health Services (CBCHS) SEEPD, and the Jakiri Council.***
- 9.3 ***Appropriate acknowledgment from others is required for use of all materials and intellectual property.***

ARTICLE 10: TERMINATION

- 10.1 ***The MoU may, at any time during its period of validity be terminated by one of the parties upon prior notice to the other in writing no sooner than six months before the termination date.***
- 10.2 ***If terminated by either party, any property produced through this agreement shall not be copied, distributed or destroyed by SEEPD Program or the Council without prior agreement.***

Appendix 5.2: Example of Action Plan

**SOCIO ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (SEEPD)
PROGRAM**

Disability and Inclusive Development Action Plan

Name of Council: _____ **Today's Date:** 9/12/2015

Goal: 4.2.1 Take lead in organising community outreaches.			
Strategy: Empower the relevant stakeholders to lead the council in outreaches			
Action steps	Resources	Measure of implementation	Person Responsible
<i>What steps must be taken to implement our strategy?</i>	<i>What specific supports are needed to implement this action step?</i>	<i>How will you know that you are making success?</i>	<i>Who is most closely responsible and accountable for taking each action?</i>
Appoint a disability focal person for the council.	Training in disability inclusive development.	Municipal decision appointing the FP	Mayor
Formally introduce disability focal person to the SEEPD Program.	None	Letter of introduction written and dispatched	

Bibliography

- Agarwal, Sanjay. (2011). *Increasing Accountability through Budget Transparency at the Subnational Level in Cameroon*. The World Bank.
- Akum, Fonteh and Nyamnjoh, Francis. (2008). *The Cameroon GCE Crisis: A Test of Anglophone Solidarity*. Langaa RPCIG.
- Almog-Bar, Michal, and Hillel Schmid. (2014). "Advocacy Activities of Non-profit Human Service Organisations: A Critical Review" in *Non-profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*. 43(1): 11-35.
- Amenta, Edwin; Caren, Neal; Chiarello, Elizabeth, and Yang Su. (2010). "The Political Consequences of Social Movements." *The Annual Review of Sociology*. 36: 287-307.
- Andrews, Kenneth T. and Bob Edwards. (2004). "Advocacy Organizations in the U.S. Political Process" *Annual Review of Sociology*. 30: 479-506.
- Atanga, Murfor. (2011). *The Anglophone Cameroon Predicament*. Langaa Research and Publishing CIG.
- Barbour, Rosaline. (2008). *Doing Focus Groups*. SAGE.
- Bhopal, Kalwant. and Deucher, Ross. (2015). *Researching Marginalized Groups*. New York: Routledge.
- Bryson, John M. (2004). "What to do when Stakeholders Matter. Stakeholder Identification and Analysis Techniques" in *Public Management Review*, 6(1):21-53.
- Bukenya, Badru, and Sam Hickey. (2014). "NGOs, Civil Society and Development" in *The Handbook of Civil Society in Africa*. Edited by Ebenezer Obadare, 311-336.
- Busby, Joshua W. (2010). "Movement Success and State Acceptance of Normative Commitments" in *Moral Movements and Foreign Policy*. Edited by Joshua Busby, 33-69.
- By de Wit, Sara. (2015). "Global Warning: An Ethnography of the Encounter between Global and Local Climate-Change Discourses" in *The Bamenda Grassfields*. Cameroon: Langaa RPCIG
- Channels, Noreen. (1985). *Social Science Methods in the Legal Process*. Rowman and Allanheld Publishers.
- Cheka, Cosmas. (2007). "The State of the Process of Decentralisation in Cameroon" in *Africa Development*. Vol. XXXII, No. 2, 181-196.

- Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm. (1990). "Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons and Evaluative Criteria" in *Qualitative Sociology*. Vol. 13, No. 1, 3-21.
- Cress, Daniel and Snow, David. (2000). "The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing" in *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 105, No. 4, 1063-1104.
- Delancy, Mark-Dike et al. (2010). *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon*, Scarecrow Press.
- Donatella della Porta, Donatella and Diani, Mario. (1999). *Social Movements: An Introduction*. Blackwell Publishing.
- Eisinger, Peter K. (1973). "The Conditions of Protest Behaviour in American Cities" in *The American Political Science Review*. 67(1):11-28.
- Fanso, Verkijika G. (1999). "Anglophone and Francophone Nationalisms in Cameroon" in *The Round Table*. Volume 350, Number 1, 1 April, 281-296(16).
- Fonchingong, Charles. (2004). "The Travails of Democratization in Cameroon in the Context of Political Liberalisation since the 1990s" in *African and Asian Studies*. Volume 3., no.1, 33-59.
- Gamson, Willian. (1990). *The Strategy of Social Protest*, Wadsworth Publication quoted in Oliver et al. (2003). "Emerging Trends in the Study of Protest and Social Movements" in *Research in Political Sociology*. Volume 12, 213-244.
- Gros, J.G. (1995). "The Hard Lessons of Cameroon" in *Journal of Democracy*. 6(3): 112-127.
- Guo, L., Li, T. and Zhang, H. (2014). "Strategic Information Sharing in Competing Channels" in *Production and Operations Management*. 23: 1719-1731.
- Houghton, Stephen. (2006). *From Traditional to Ecological: Understanding Attention Deficit Disorders Through Quantitative and Qualitative Research*. Nova Publishers.
- Inglis, Andrew and Susan Guy. (1999). "Tips for Trainers: Introducing the 'H-form' – a method for monitoring and evaluation" in *PLA Notes 34*: 84-87. London: IIED.
- International Crisis Group. (2010). "Cameroon: Fragile State?" in *Crisis Group Africa Report*. 160: 1-40.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. (1994). *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kolb, Felix. (2007). *Protest and Opportunities. The Political Outcomes of Social Movements*. Campus Verlag.

- Kriesi, Hanspeter. (1992). "New social movements and political opportunities in Western Europe" in *European Journal of Research*. Volume 22, Issue 2, 219–244.
- Lewis, David, and Nazneen Kanji. (2009). "Development NGOs in Perspective." in *Non-Governmental Organizations and Development*. Edited by David Lewis and Nazneen Kanji, 200-213.
- Lipesky, Michael. (1968). *Protest as a Political Resource*. University of Wisconsin.
- Lofland, John. (1996). *Social Movement Organizations: Guide to Research on Insurgent Realities*. Transaction Publishers.
- Maney, Gregory M., Kutz-Flamenbaum Rachel V., Rohlinger Deana A. and Jeff Goodwin. (2012). "An Introduction to Strategies for Social Change." in *Strategies for Social Change*. Edited by Gregory M. Maney, Kutz-Flamenbaum, Rohlinger D. A., Goodwin J., xi.
- Meyer, David S., and Suzanne Staggenborg. (2012). "Thinking about strategy." in *Strategies for Social Change*. Edited by Gregory M. Maney, Kutz-Flamenbaum, Rohlinger D. A., Goodwin J., 3-22.
- Myers, Michael. (2008). *Qualitative Research in Business and Management*. SAGE.
- Nkwi, Walter Gam. (2006). "The Dilemma of Civil Society in Cameroon Since 1990: Which Way Forward." in *African Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 9, Nos 1&2, 91-106.
- Nkwi, Walter. (2010). *Voicing the Voiceless: Contributions to Closing Gaps in Cameroon History*. African Books Collective.
- Nyamnjoh, Francis. (2005). *Africa's Media: Democracy and the Politics of Belonging*. Zed Books.
- Oluwu, D. et Al. (1995). *Governance and Democratisation in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
- Opp, Karl-Dieter. (2009). *Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements*. New York: Routledge
- Policy and Operations Evaluation Department. (2014). *Evaluation of Policy Influencing, Lobby and Advocacy*. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Sabatello, Maya and Schulze, Marianne. (2013). *Human Rights and Disability Advocacy*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Socio Economic Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities. (2015). *Documenting the Process of Inclusive Education in the Northwest region of Cameroon*. Cameroon Baptist Convention-Health Services.

Smiley, Tavis. (2010). *The Covenant in Action*. Hey House Inc.

Snow, David A. and Danny Trom. (2002). "The Case Study and the Study of Social Movements." in *Methods of Social Movement Research*. Edited by Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg, 146-172.

Steklenburg, Jacqueline v., and Bert Klandermans. (2009). "Social movement theory: Past, presence & prospects." in *Movers and Shakers: Social Movements in Africa*. Edited by Stephen Ellis and Ineke van Kessel, 17-44.

Tarrow, Sidney. (1994). *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Tavakoli, Hossein. (2013). *A Dictionary of Research Methodology and Statistics*. Rahnama Press.

Tilly, Charles. (1978). *From Mobilization to Revolution*. MA: Addison-Wesley.

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (2009). *Policy Guidelines on Inclusive Education*. UNESCO, Paris.

Xie, Lei & Van Der Heijden, Hein-Anton. (2010). "Environmental Movements and Political Opportunities: The Case of China" in *Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest*. 9:1, 51-68.

Waale. Douglas. (2008). *Tracing Power and Influence in Networks*. International Food Policy Res Institution.

Yeo, Rebecca. (2005). *Disability, Poverty and the New Development Agenda*. Disability KAR.

Online Sources

"2007 Cameroon Study – Disability Rights Promotion International". *Drpi.research.yorku.ca*. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 July 2016.

"Advocating For People With Disability In Cameroon | Children Of The Earth". *Coeworld.org*. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 July 2016.

"About The Cameroon Baptist Convention Health Services". *Cbhealthservices.org*. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 July 2016.

"Cameroon General Certificate Of Education Board". *Up Station Mountain Club*. N.p., 2006. Web. 23 July 2016.

"Disability Statistics - Labour Market Access - Statistics Explained". *Ec.europa.eu*. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 July 2016.

"ESRC Framework for research ethics Updated January 2015". *ESRC.ac.uk*. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 July 2016.

"Gov'T Hails CBC For Promoting Inclusive Education". *Cameroonweb.com*. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 July 2016.

"Global Development News, Investigations and Analysis | The Guardian". *the Guardian*. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 July 2016.

"In Cameroon, A School Helps to Integrate Disabled Children Into Society | Marta Arias". *the Guardian*. N.p., 2015. Web. 23 July 2016.

"Protection of Persons With Disabilities". *Minas.cm*. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 July 2016.

"Sustainable Development Goals, Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform". *Sustainabledevelopment.un.org*. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 July 2016.

"UN Enable - World Programme Of Action, Page 4/10". *Un.org*. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 July 2016.

"UNESCO Office in Bangkok: What Is Inclusive Education?". *Unescobkk.org*. N.o., 2016. Web. 23 July 2016.

Union, Inter-Parliamentary. "IPU PARLINE Database: CAMEROON (Assemblée Nationale - National Assembly), Last Elections". *Ipu.org*. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 July 2016.

"Welcome To The Cameroon Baptist Convention (CBC)". *Cbc-cm.org*. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 July 2016.

"Welcome To The Official Website Of The GCE Board Of Cameroon - The Cameroon General Certificate Of Education Board". *Camgceb.org*. N.p., 2014. Web. 23 July 2016

